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Stealth Marketing and Antibranding: The
Love that Dare Not Speak Its Name
SONIA K. KATYAL†
INTRODUCTION
In the 1992 film classic, Wayne’s World,1 Mike Myers
(Wayne) and Dana Carvey (Garth), two metalheads, are
confronted with stardom after their homemade cable access
show gets purchased by a local television station.2 Their
new corporate producer, Benjamin Kane (played brilliantly
by Rob Lowe) entreats them to allow a sponsor, Noah
Vanderhoff, a prominent spot on the show, gently reminding
the two that they are bound by contract to do so.3 “Well,
that’s where I see things just a little differently,” Wayne
replies, opening a Pizza Hut box, with the company’s
famous logo emblazoned directly before the camera.4
“Contract or no, I will not bow to any sponsor,” he proclaims
loudly, opening the box and taking out a large pizza slice.5
They continue to discuss the matter (“It’s just the nature of
the beast,” Lowe tries to explain to Wayne).6 “Maybe I’m
wrong on this one,” Wayne tepidly responds, “but for me,
the beast doesn’t involve selling out,” chomping loudly on a
chip from a large Doritos Chips bag.7 “Garth, you know
what I’m talking about, right?” Wayne asks, while the
† Professor of Law, Fordham Law School. The author wishes to express her
thanks to the participants at the Buffalo Advertising Conference, especially
Mark Bartholomew, Rebecca Tushnet, and Lisa Ramsey, and Rachael Braswell,
Jana Checa Chong, Sarah Constantine, Justin Ferguson, Rachel Kronman, Dan
Feng Mei, Alison Schilling, and Genan Zilkha for excellent research assistance.
Thanks also to the participants in the Trademarks, Branding and Freedom of
Expression course for such stimulating discussions of these issues.
1. WAYNE’S WORLD (Paramount Pictures 1992).
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
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camera pans over to Garth, dressed in head-to-toe Reebok
gear, who poignantly agrees, “It’s like people only do these
things because they can get paid. And that’s just really
sad.”8 The scene ends with Wayne proclaiming that his
choice was, “the choice of a new generation,” while sipping
from a prominently displayed Pepsi can, offering a wide
toothy grin.9
The scene turned out to be one of the most unforgettable
moments of product placement in the history of American
film, with the sponsors (Pizza Hut, Doritos, Pepsi, etc.)
engaging in both indirect forms of advertising and blatant
self-parody. As one commentator explains, the genius of the
scene was motivated by the filmmaker’s willingness to
engage in the direct selling of commodities even as it poked
fun at product placement.10 It may have masqueraded as an
ironic or satirical commentary on branding and
commerciality, but it still comprised product placement
nonetheless.11 As one report observed, “Wayne’s World may
have skewered the concept of product placement, but they
also cashed the checks and laughed all the way to the
bank.”12
Nearly twenty years later, things have not really
changed, except that the world is now, even more, perhaps,
a landscape of product placement and branding.13 “In the
twenty-first century,” one commentator notes, “brands have
acquired a place in the world unimaginable in any previous
period of history.”14 Consumers, too, have fallen in love with
the brand.15 Brands permeate the fabric of our lives—they
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Michael Joshua Rowin, Capital Won, REVERSE SHOT, May 2007, http://
www.reverseshot.com/article/waynes_world.
11. Id.
12. K. Thor Jensen, Guide to Product Placement, June 30, 2008, http://w
ww.ugo.com/movies/product-placement/?cur=waynes-world.
13. See DAVID A. AAKER & ALEXANDER L. BIEL, BRAND EQUITY & ADVERTISING:
ADVERTISING’S ROLE IN BUILDING STRONG BRANDS 67 (1993) (“Anthropologist
John Sherry (1987) noted that brands have become so ubiquitous in 20th-century
America that we could say we are living in a rich ‘brandscape.’”).
14. THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION: LINKING IDENTITY, REPUTATION,
CORPORATE BRAND 52 (Majken Shultz et al. eds., 2000).
15. Id.
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help construct our identities, our expressions, our desires,
and our language. Yet inasmuch as they serve as powerful
expressions of consumer identity and desire, they are also
an important vessel of corporate identity and property.
By inhabiting these two worlds—the world of the
consumer, and the world of the corporation—brands have
come to play an increasingly vexing role in public
consciousness. On one hand, they represent a proprietary
vessel, a trade symbol that allows a company to
symbolically encapsulate its identity—its goals, its
products, and, increasingly, its philosophy.16 Yet on the
other hand, brands are also becoming an expressive index of
consumer identity and philosophy. Branding offers us a
curious transformation of the corporate to the personal; it
offers individuals a way to express certain identities,
preferences, and passions symbolically: some wear Adidas
and Nike shoes because they favor an active, athletic,
physically competitive lifestyle, along with the philosophy of
competitive living; others dress themselves in Prada’s subtle
shades to suggest a demure, classic, sophisticated presence.
These associations are tightly socially constructed through
advertising, but they are also images that are malleable and
easily changed.
Further, at the same time that brands are expressive,
they are also powerful devices of economic power and
market dominance, a factor which leads to potent struggles
over their meaning and definition. For, aside from the
idealized convergence between personal and corporate
identity that a brand represents, a brand can be also
simultaneously deeply political and deeply commercial, and
as part of our cultural consciousness, a brand can often
serve as a powerful organizing principle for political action.
In just the last few decades, a new movement of activists
has sprung up internationally and domestically, engaging in
artistic and political activity to challenge the expansion of
the brand into public discourse.17 Some types of
“antibranding” seek to retake public space for their own
expression, using graffiti and street art to dissent from the
commercialization of the public sphere; some seek to simply
16. For an excellent discussion, see Laura Heymann, The Public’s Domain in
Trademark Law: A First Amendment Theory of the Consumer, 43 GA. L. REV.
651 (2009).
17. Sonia Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489 (2006).
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rebrand or recode existing brands for the purposes of humor
or social commentary. Sometimes antibrands might target a
certain brand for opposition; at other times, they might
utilize a brand for the purposes of satirical or humorous
commentary on another subject. And yet, the ways in which
these artists have done so have raised complicated
questions of identity, language, and control—setting up a
clash between the First Amendment and intellectual
property.
Admittedly, antibrands highlight a critical disjunction
between the economic rationale of the marketplace and
freedom of speech, and the regulatory, mediating role
played by law. But today a major shift has taken place
within the spheres inhabited by the brand and the
antibrand, respectively. For many years, the brand and the
antibrand peacefully coexisted, and most consumers were
largely able to identify both by drawing upon context, in
both the worlds of real and digital space. However, more
recently as consumers have grown more and more
overloaded with information, advertisers have been forced
to seek out more creative ways to communicate their
messages to the public, leading to a blurring of the lines
between commercial and noncommercial forms of
expression. Witness the Wayne’s World sketch as a
preliminary example of this trend—blending satire, product
placement, and parody.18 Here, a branding event utilized
the power and parody of antibranding to cleverly both
subvert and continue to sell its image in real and digital
space.
While most of us who live in urban landscapes are
familiar with the recognizable dialogue offered by branding
and antibranding, the increasing prevalence of guerrilla or
stealth marketing has tended to blur the lines between
traditional and nontraditional forms of advertising. Now,
18. For examples, see Dale Buss, A Product-Placement Hall of Fame,
BUSINESSWEEK, June 22, 1998, available at http://www.businesswe
ek.com/1998/25/b3583062.htm; Mark R. Greer, Going Hollywood: Beverage
Companies are Dealing with Advertising Overload With Less Traditional TieIns, BEVERAGE INDUSTRY, May 1, 2003, available at http://www
.commercialalert.org/issues/culture/product-placement/going-hollywood-beverag
e-companies-are-dealing-with-advertising-overload-with-less-traditional-tie-insmarketing; Alex Fascilla, Co-op Advertising the Product Placement Way!,
Balihoo, Feb. 5, 2010, http://marketing.balihoo.com/blog/co-op-marketingsoftware/0/0/co-op-advertising-the-product-placement-way.
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many stealth or guerrilla advertisements employ product
placement, word-of-mouth marketing, and user-generated
content, often employing self-mocking humor in the process,
transforming the world of advertising as a result. Normally,
the blurring of boundaries between product placement and
parody might be considered unproblematic from a viewer’s
perspective. One might ask, what’s wrong with a little
humor in advertising, however subtle the advertising might
be? But the crossing of borders between parody and
marketing—particularly regarding user-generated content
and advertising messages that mimic its style and
presentation—has presented particular challenges for
lawyers, who must navigate the boundaries between noncommercial speech (usually the sphere of parody or an
antibrand) and commercial speech (traditionally the sphere
occupied by advertising).
A difficult set of legal issues stem from the crossover
between stealth marketing and user generated content in
both real and digital space. Today, branding opportunities
can be cloaked within ordinary noncommercial expression,
as corporate sponsorship extends further and further
toward resembling user generated content, making it
difficult to discern when content is sponsored and when it is
not. Since many forms of stealth marketing often takes
place within the nontraditional channels that antibranding
occupies (public space, websites, and other forms of media
and content), it becomes more difficult then for the
consumer to distinguish between the brand and the
antibrand, destabilizing the division between them. This
shift carries substantial legal implications for trademark
owners. When advertising is no longer limited to its
traditional channels, the public sphere becomes littered
with examples of both branding and antibranding. As a
result, it becomes all the more necessary for trademark law
to intervene, leading brand managers to act more readily to
protect the goodwill behind their marks through an
increasing reliance on trademark surveillance and ceaseand-desist strategies.
In this symposium piece devoted to the study of
advertising in the law, I focus on the relationship between
the brand and the antibrand, and the implications of their
dialectic for trademark law generally. Trademark law, I
argue, has facilitated a dual trend: while brand sponsorship
stretches into noncommercial domains, mimicking the style
and substance of user-generated content, it risks overtaking
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the traditional sphere and functions occupied by the
antibrand. In Parts I and II, I discuss the rise of both the
brand and the antibrand in public spaces. In Part III, I
discuss how advertising, increasingly, has begun to draw
upon the traditional channels occupied by antibranding
strategies, and in Part IV, I discuss some potential legal
implications from this expansion.
I. THE RISE OF THE BRAND
In 1999, a Financial Times article prominently
displayed a heading that said, “Ford to Outsource
Important Parts of Car Assembly.”19 The article quoted a
high-ranking executive who predicted that “[t]he
manufacture of cars will be a declining part of Ford’s
business.” He announced that Ford would instead
“concentrate in the future on design, branding, marketing,
sales, and service operations.”20
It is difficult to underestimate the historical significance
of this shift, given Ford’s powerful role in the
manufacturing industry in the United States. Rather than
manufacturing cars, as Ford has done for so long, the
announcement declares that Ford will simply engage in
branding instead.21 Since the rise of the Industrial
Revolution, and for many of the last several decades, Ford
Motor Company symbolized the victory of American
invention over the uncertainties created by economic and
political challenges. The success of Ford Motor Company
marked a new path for industry—for the economy, for
America—to follow. Now, almost several decades after that
fateful moment when the first Ford car left its
manufacturing plant, it appears that the American economy
has steadfastly grown to value the Ford symbol—the
brand—over the function of the original product. There has
been much ink spilled on the dangers of Ford’s strategy of

19. Tim Burt, Ford to Outsource Important Parts of Car Assembly, FIN.
TIMES, Dec. 10, 1999, at 1; see also THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note
14, at 51.
20. Burt, supra note 19, at 1; see also THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 14, at 51.
21. Burt, supra note 19, at 1; see also THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra
note 14, at 51.
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outsourcing for the American economy, but none on the
impact of its switch to a branding factory.
The Ford story typifies the power of the brand. A brand
is usually thought to be synonymous with trademarks and
trade symbols, comprising an important and valuable
component of a corporation’s intellectual property portfolio.
Here, the economic and the semiotic spheres of language
delineate the specific role that brands play in the parallel
marketplaces of both goods and speech.22 In the past, a
brand played a relatively limited role in marketing: it
served to merely identify and distinguish a certain product.
Today, however, the corporate branding strategy has both
magnified and amplified these functions by reversing the
function of a trademark. In other words, instead of serving
as a product identifier, branding strategies today make the
trademark—and the cultural identities associated with the
mark—the product itself.23 This inversion between product
and trademark is precisely what gives rise to the Ford
narrative explored above—companies no longer focus on the
product, but its brand instead. 24
A complex matrix of meanings, products, and identities
constitutes the essence of a brand. Yet this “essence,” so
difficult to define and to pin down, is also the very thing
that constructs a brand as both a commodity, as well as a
sign of expressive significance. Indeed, the most successful
brands enable a triadic convergence of sign, self, and
corporate identity. And intellectual property law, too, plays
an intimate role in enabling this convergence: corporate
branding strategies focus specifically on the creation and
propagation of trademarks through advertising. In this way,
trademarks have become part of not only an economic
market, but also a metaphorical market because they
involve—and propagate—a system of using signs to control
meaning and language. In this sense, therefore, brands are
economic, expressive, and identificative at the same time—
for both the consumer, as well as the corporation.
22. For a longer discussion, see Sonia Katyal, Trademark Intersectionality, 57
UCLA L. REV. (forthcoming Aug. 2010).
23. For a related perspective, see Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68
N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 960 (1993), who writes “[N]o longer do trademarks merely
identify sources; frequently today they become part of the product itself.”
24. THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 51.
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How did this happen? The story here begins, at the end
of the nineteenth century, when the corporate world was
ensconced in an identity crisis.25 Despite the 1886 case of
Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad,26 in which
the Supreme Court endowed the business corporation with
the legal status of “person” under the Fourteenth
Amendment, corporations were largely regarded in the
public eye as “soulless” entities, bereft of a definable essence
or personality.27 As the giant business corporation became a
permanently transfixed entity on the American business
landscape, it became the very symbol of impersonality and
diffidence. Thus, corporations became increasingly aware of
a massive need for public respect and social recognition.
Public perception of “corporate soullessness” involved a
perceived lack of conscience on the part of the corporation,
coupled with the immense power, efficiency, and profit that
large-scale companies represented.28
The public perception of a corporation as a cold,
impenetrable entity created a need for corporate
redefinition. Across the board, corporations had to overcome
these perceptions in order to become a definable
personality, in order to attain and to communicate a sense
of internal vitality to its employees, and to the general
public. Part of this strategy focused on advertising as the
central and most powerful way to alter this perception.
Entrepreneurs began to infuse advertising with their image
and personality, almost as if they were running for office:
Henry Ford participated in automobile races; legendary
25. See ROLAND MARCHAND, CREATING THE CORPORATE SOUL: THE RISE OF
PUBLIC RELATIONS AND CORPORATE IMAGERY IN AMERICAN BIG BUSINESS 7 (1998).
26. See Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 262 (1964); Minneapolis & Saint
Louis Ry. Co. v. Beckwith, 129 U.S. 26 (1889); Santa Clara County v. S. Pac.
R.R. Co., 118 U.S. 394 (1886).
27. MARCHAND, supra note 25, at 7.
28. See id. at 7-8. Marchand writes, during that time:
Gone were the days when “the maker of goods dealt personally . . . with
the customer and was known and understood by him, as man to man.”
As Vice President Hall of AT&T lamented in a 1909 address, “The
public does not know us . . . It has never seen us, never met us, does not
know where we live, who we are, what our good qualities are. It simply
knows that we are a corporation, and to the general public a
corporation is a thing.”
Id.
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shoe manufacturer W.L. Douglas published ads in national
magazines emblazoning his picture; King Gillette placed his
clean-shaven personage on his ads; the Smith brothers
placed their likenesses on boxes of cough drops.29 In the
early 1900s, the increased use of colors, simple logos,
letterheads, and even depictions of the corporate factory all
helped to suggest an image of an entity that constituted the
sum total of the living, breathing individuals that worked
within its auspices, rather than a cold, monolithic entity.30
At the very same time, corporate branding began to
develop.31 Earlier, brands were largely synonymous with
particular products,32 usually home products, including
soap, jam, toothpaste, and breakfast cereals.33 Most
companies during this early period used advertising that
appealed to one’s rational considerations: the written text of
an advertisement, for example, offered an in-depth
justification for a product’s use coupled with little
suggestive imagery, and ads comprehensively detailed the
good’s superior quality, attributes, and performance.34
Because publishers tended to require that advertisement
submissions conform to a rigid, dual-column format,
advertising was mostly limited to specific drafting of
language, rather than the uses of symbols and dramatic
imagery to describe a product.35 However, in the latter part
of the nineteenth century, magazines, increasingly, became
more and more dominant carriers of advertising, leading to
a transition from verbal to visual styles of advertising.
Agencies, rather than manufacturers themselves, became
increasingly saddled with the responsibility of creating a
particular essence, or identity, around the product in order
to differentiate it from its competition. Advertising began to
rely on an increasingly common array of symbols, slogans,
poetry, testimonials, coupons, contests, stars, and humor.36
29. See id. at 26-27.
30. See id. at 28-29.
31. THE EXPRESSIVE ORGANIZATION, supra note 14, at 52.
32. Id. at 53.
33. Id.
34. WILLIAM LEISS ET AL., SOCIAL COMMUNICATION
PRODUCTS AND IMAGES OF WELL-BEING 124 (1990).
35. Id.
36. Id.

IN
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As a result, the advertising agency attained a newfound
prominence as the vehicle by which home products became
not only marketed, but personified as well.37
Today, branding strategies make up a significant
portion of general corporate strategy; financial analysts
claim that brand equity makes up a tremendous amount of
company value.38 At times, a company’s brand equity has
been more important than the book value ascribed to a
particular product.39 Unlike the actual product, which is
something with a functional purpose, a brand offers
something in addition, an “added value” that consumers
value enough to purchase.40 This ‘brand value’ or ‘brand
equity’ is precarious and complex, comprising a host of
tangible—and legally protectable—qualities such as
physical appearance, packaging, design. On a more complex
level, however, a brand also encompasses a host of
intangible qualities, such as consumer attitudes toward the
manufacturing company, or beliefs about the brand in
relationship to one’s self and others.41 Increasingly, the
intangibility of the latter has become a primary vehicle in
building brand equity. Here, a brand encapsulates much
more than a tangible product or trade symbol, logo, or
name—it encapsulates the critical essence of a
corporation—its products, its employees, and, increasingly,
its consumers. It is this ephemeral added value that
constitutes the value of a brand—its intangible essence.

37. Id. at 105-07.
38. See Deven R. Desai & Sandra L. Rierson, Confronting the Genericism
Conundrum, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 1789, 1794-1797 (2007); Steve Hartman,
Brand Equity Impairment – The Meaning of Dilution, 87 TRADEMARK REP. 418,
419–22 (1997).
39. LEISS ET AL., supra note 34, at 105-07. At its simplest level, a brand is
defined as “a name that refers to the product of a particular manufacturer in a
particular product category.” AAKER & BIEL, supra note 13, at 33; see also
Deborah R. Gerhardt, Consumer Investment in Trademark, 88 N.C. L. REV. 427,
459-67 (2010); Jerre B. Swann, An Interdisciplinary Approach to Brand
Strength, 96 TRADEMARK REP. 943, 946-955 (2006).
40. JOHN PHILIP JONES & JAN S. SLATER, WHAT’S IN A NAME? ADVERTISING AND
31 (2d ed. 2003).

THE CONCEPT OF BRANDS

41. AAKER & BIEL, supra note 13, at 33.
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II. ANTIBRANDING AND PUBLIC SPACE42
There is, however, an aspect of the branding enterprise
that is often overlooked. As countless scholars both inside
and outside of the legal academy have argued, language is
both immutable and mutable at the same time; just as signs
serve as vessels for corporate identification, they can also
serve as vessels for consumer recoding as well. Put another
way, the “perfect convergence” that a corporation strives for
between the consumer, the corporation, and the brand is not
always a stable fixture, particularly in public space.
Instead, this convergence can be dismantled, dissected,
exposed, and ultimately reformulated into another, parallel
system of meaning. This process is distinctly empowering
for the consumer, and allows for a space of contestation
between the intended audience, the brand, and the
corporation.
As Deven Desai has pointed out, since modern
trademark theory tends to focus primarily on the
commercial functions that marks play, it tends to overlook
the multivariate and expressive roles that brands often play
in society—particularly for consumers and the companies
that sponsor their creation.43 This is particularly so
regarding the growing role of consumers in marketing
practices, where they appear, not merely as passive
recipients of information, but instead, as “active
participants in a trademark dialogue.”44
A. The Audience as Participant
According to prominent media theorist Stuart Hall, a
consumer can choose between three possible modes of
interpretation of a given text.45 Consider advertising as an
example. First, a consumer can choose to adopt the
dominant interpretation and fully accept, adopt, and
42. Heymann, supra note 16.
43. Devin R. Desai, A Brand Theory of Trademark Law 6 (Thomas Jefferson
Sch. of Law Research Paper No. 1585327), available at http://ssrn.com/a
bstract=1585327.
44. See Heymann, supra note 16, at 655.
45. See Stuart Hall, Encoding/Decoding, in CULTURE, MEDIA, LANGUAGE
(Stuart Hall et al. eds., 1980), reprinted in MEDIA AND CULTURE STUDIES 174-75
(Meenakshi Gigi Durham & Douglas M. Kellner eds., 2001).
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reproduce the preferred reading of the producer or
advertiser.46 This is often the path chosen by a consumer
who chooses to purchase a product for the ‘brand image’ and
associations that it conveys. Second, alternatively, a
consumer might choose to adopt an oppositional reading
whereby the consumer understands, but then rejects the
proffered interpretation.47 In the case of advertising, an
oppositional reading might comprise a situation whereby a
consumer might observe, but then disagree with a
particular message conveyed by an advertiser, and choose
not to purchase a product.
Hall’s third alternative involves a reader who adopts a
negotiated reading, whereby the reader might choose to
adopt the preferred reading, but also might resist and
modify the code to reflect his or her “own positions,
experiences, and interests.”48 This position might be
represented by an individual who engages in a practice like
parody, one that draws upon an image but also subverts it
at the same time. Hall’s second and third approaches
overlap nicely with the idea of an antibrand, which places
the consumer or prospective consumer at the center of a
different cultural matrix, one that seeks to reinterpret and
resignify the semiological process described in the previous
section. Some antibranding projects adopt an oppositional
framework to a certain brand, following Hall’s observations;
the more complex commentaries, however, adopt Hall’s
tactic of negotiation, seeking to both decode and recode
particular images in ways that subtly reveal the need for
consumers to actively “talk back” to the hidden codes within
advertising.
Antibranding responses may not always be as
oppositional as one might presume, however. One might
suggest that Hall’s descriptions pave the way for a variety
of antibranding possibilities that would fall under the broad
category of a “negotiated” reading. One example might be a
situation where an individual might appropriate, modify, or
rebrand an advertising message to critique the product, the
corporation, or something else. A great example might be
46. See id.; see also Daniel Chandler, Semiotics for Beginners, http://www.a
ber.ac.uk/media/Documents/S4B/index.html (last visited July 29, 2010).
47. Chandler, supra note 46.
48. Id.
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the publication Adbusters, which targets both particular
companies and advertising campaigns, but also targets the
more general trend of consumption in both the United
States and Canada. In some examples from their magazine
and website, particularly their ‘spoof ads,’ an individual
might initially take up a proffered message from
mainstream advertising, but then later, appropriate and
modify an advertising campaign to send a message that
diverges from the one intended. In one example, titled,
Absolut Nonsense, an image of an Absolut vodka bottle is
depicted with the slogan, “Any suggestion that our
advertising campaign has contributed to alcoholism, drunk
driving, or wife and child beating is absolute nonsense. No
one pays any attention to advertising.”49 The message of the
ad is unmistakably ironic: do not believe that such
undesirable activities are tied to the scourge of alcohol
consumption and associated advertising.50
Parodies like Absolut Nonsense raise important textual
questions: is the parody targeting Absolut (the vodka),
Absolut’s marketing campaign, or the general practice of
alcohol consumption? Or is it targeting all three? And if so,
should trademark law interfere? The Absolut Nonsense ad
is an example of one particular technique to illustrate the
practice of antibranding: “subvertising,” which is basically
ad parody.51 Subvertising involves the conscious recoding of
various brand images in order to expose and thereby
transgress the proffered construction of social meaning
offered by the corporation.52 Consider these examples:
49. Mark Dery, Mark Dery’s Shovelware, Culture Jamming: Hacking,
Slashing, and Sniping in the Empire of Signs, Oct. 10, 2004, http://www.
markdery.com/archives/books/culture_jamming/#000005%23more.
50. Indeed, the brand Absolut has been the target of both veneration and
criticism; one book meticulously represents the rise of the brand, see CARL
HAMILTON, ABSOLUT: BIOGRAPHY OF A BOTTLE (2000), while a series of subverts
focus specifically on Absolut’s images and bottle design to communicate antidrinking messages. See Adbusters, Spoof Ads, https://www.adbuster
s.org/gallery/spoofads/alcohol (last visited July 29, 2010).
51. Alexander Barley, Battle of the Image, NEW STATESMAN, May 21, 2001, at
45 (“Subvertising is an attempt to turn the iconography of the advertisers into a
noose around their neck. . . . A subvert is a satirical version or the defacing of an
existing advert, a detournement, an inversion designed to make us forget
consumerism and consider instead social or political issues.”).
52. Dery, supra note 49.
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· A person has created a near-perfect replication
of an Old Navy logo on a clothing tag that is usually
attached to the inside of a person’s apparel. The
subvert, which is designed to replicate the
percentage of fibers on a tag, instead says “77% child
labor 22% adult labor and ‘Made in Sweatshops’”
underneath. The implication of the ad is
unmistakable, reminding the consumer that he or
she is making a purchase that is not only composed
of particular types of fibers, but also a substantial
degree of child labor.
· The character of “Joe Chemo” is designed to
replicate almost perfectly the infamous figure of “Joe
Camel,” who was used to sell Camel cigarettes.53
· On December 3, 2002, the 18th anniversary of
the toxic gas leak at a chemical plant in Bhopal,
India, the Yes Men e-mailed thousands of journalists
a press release purporting to be from Dow chemical,
which explained Dow’s failure to resolve the health
and environmental consequences of the accident. “We
understand the anger and the hurt,” claimed an
(alleged) Dow spokesman. ‘“But Dow does not and
cannot acknowledge responsibility.”’54 The Yes Men
also included a link to their own Dow-Chemical.com,
a Website resembling the corporation's real site at
www.dow.com.55
· Just this past year, in response to the British
Petroleum oil spill in the Gulf, Greenpeace, an
environmental awareness group, announced a
contest to ‘Redesign BP’s logo,’ explaining:

53. See http://www.joechemo.org/ (last visited March 18, 2010); Adbusters,
Spoof Ads: Tobacco, https://www.adbusters.org/gallery/spoofads/tobacco (last
visited March 10, 2010). “Joe Chemo” first appeared in print in the Adbusters
magazine in 1996. See http://www.joechemo.org/about.htm.
54. See Caleb Carr, Dow v. Thing: A Free-Speech Infringement That's Worse
Than Censorship, VILLAGE VOICE, Jan. 21, 2003, available at
http://www.villagevoice.com/2003-01-21/news/dow-v-thing/ (quoting the Yes
Men).
55. Id. In response to Dow’s threats of copyright and trademark
infringement, the entire host server was shut down, making it impossible for a
variety of organizations to access their network. Id.
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A few years ago, BP rebranded themselves as ‘beyond petroleum’.
And yet BP is pursuing . . . deepwater drilling, despite the
massive environmental damage that's being caused by their
business.
That’s why we want you to rebrand them.

The campaign concludes, “BP’s slick green logo
doesn’t suit a company that engages in dangerous
offshore drilling. We’re inviting you to design them a
new logo that’s more suitable for their dirty
business.” 56
Typically, subvertising can cover a whole variety of
different types of ad parody—everything from projects that
appropriate particular brands to those that communicate a
certain political statement that may or may not be
indirectly tied to a corporation. At times, subvertisements
can also include ‘gripe sites’ that may resemble an official
corporate
website.
One
newspaper
reports
that
“conservatively, more than half of the Fortune 1000
companies have encountered some type of website critical of
their business.”57 These sites take on a myriad of different

56. Redesign BP’s Logo, Greenpeace,
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/news/gulf-oil-spill/bp-logo (last visited July 29,
2010).
57. Jacqueline D. Lipton, Commerce Versus Commentary: Gripe Sites,
Parody, and the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 1327
(2006); Robert Trigaux, Gripe.com, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 31, 1999,
at H1; see also Margreth Barrett, Domain Names, Trademarks and the First
Amendment: Searching for Meaningful Boundaries, 39 CONN. L. REV. 973, 100634 (2007); Richard D. Salgado, Piracy and Chaos in the Marketplace of Ideas:
Why Money Cannot Be Everything When Assessing Initial-Interest Confusion
and Nonprofit Trademark Holders, 61 ARK. L. REV. 241, 258-69 (2008); Hannibal
Travis, The Battle for Mindshare: The Emerging Consensus that the First
Amendment Protects Corporate Criticism and Parody on the Internet, 10 VA. J.L.
& TECH. 3, 74-94 (2005); Mindy P. Fox, Note, Does It Really Suck? The Impact of
Cutting-Edge Marketing Tactics on Internet Trademark Law and Gripe Site
Domain Disputes, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 225 (2009);
Nate Anderson, Glen Beck Loses Domain Dispute, Still Ends Up with Domain,
ARS TECHNICA, Nov. 9, 2009, available at http://arstechnica.com/techpolicy/news/2009/11/glenn-beck-loses-domain-dispute-still-ends-up-with-domain
.ars; Brian Baxter, Gripe Site Targeted by Goldman Sachs Slaps Back, THE AM.
LAWYER,
Apr.
15,
2009,
available
at
http://www.law.com/jsp/art
icle.jsp?id=1202429904594; Jacqui Cheng, Gripe Site Prevails in Domain
Cybersquatting Case, ARS TECHNICA, Mar. 3, 2010, available at
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characters—some simply offer various narratives from
consumers who have been disappointed by a particular
product or company, pairing a trademark with the word
“sucks” in a web address58—to the most sophisticated and
seductive of ad parodies. Many subvertisements, like the
Absolut example, reveal a subconscious message in an
advertisement, uncovering a perceived deeper meaning or
truth hiding behind the euphemism.59
Today, the modern antibranding movement is widely
associated with the early 1990s anti-globalization
movement, even though similar projects regarding an
“aesthetics of democracy” have been a significant part of the
counter-culture art movements of the 50s, 60s, and 70s.60
These counter-culture movements, from the 1950s to the
early 1990s, led to the formation of a new movement in
North America and Europe that called itself “culture
jamming,” which referred to taking existing media
generated text and altering it to say something different.61
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2010/03/gripe-site-prevails-in-domaincybersquatting-case.ars.
58. Indeed, there are so many sites that Yahoo has created a particular
directory for complaint sites alone. See, e.g., Yahoo! Directory Consumer
Opinion>Individual Companies, http://dir.yahoo.com/Society_and_Culture/Issu
es_and_Causes/Consumer_Advocacy_and_Information/Consumer_Opinion/Indiv
idual_Companies (last visited July 29, 2010).
59. See NAOMI KLEIN, NO LOGO 279 (2002) [hereinafter NO LOGO]; Naomi
Klein, Culture Jamming: Ads Under Attack, BRANDWEEK, July 10, 2000, at 28
[hereinafter Culture Jamming].
60. See Martin Morris, Contradictions of Post-modern Consumerism and
Resistance, 64 STUD. IN POL. ECON. 25 (2001) (listing German Expressionists,
Russian Constructivists, as prologues); see also FIONA BRADLEY, SURREALISM
(MOVEMENTS IN MODERN ART) (Tate Gallery 1997) (documenting major surrealist
artists); GUY DEBORD AND THE SITUATIONIST INTERNATIONAL: TEXTS AND
DOCUMENTS 285, 293 (Tom McDonough ed., John Goodman trans., 2002);
ROBERT MOTHERWELL, THE DADA PAINTERS AND POETS: AN ANTHOLOGY (1989)
(1951) (collection of essays, manifestos, and illustrations from Dada artists
including Tristan Tzara, Georges Hugnet, and Marcel Duchamp); HANS
RICHTER, DADA: ART AND ANTI-ART (World of Art) (Thames and Hudson Inc. ed.,
1985) (1964); NAHMA SANDROW, SURREALISM: THEATER, ARTS, IDEAS
(iUniverise.com, Inc. ed., 2000) (1972).
61. For discussion on these projects see KALLE LASN, CULTURE JAM: THE
UNCOOLING OF AMERICA (1999); NO LOGO, supra note 59; David Darts, Visual
Culture Jam: Art, Pedagogy, and Creative Resistance, STUD. ART EDU., Summer
2004, at 313, 319 (describing the ways in which “culture jammers” and socially
engaged artists have helped to undermine and expose cultural, political, social,
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The world of culture jamming has a number of different
approaches.62 It includes a number of approaches to visual
and verbal representation—including recoding, subverting,
and reclaiming certain kinds of government, corporate, and
private property, both intellectual and real in character.63
Other forms of culture jamming include advertising
campaigns against consumerism, “smart mob” interruptions
in public space, ironic defacement of billboards, the
promotion of international “buy nothing day” and other acts
of minor civil disobedience such as trespassing and public
protest.64
Antibranding activism serves to expose, dissect, and
then recode various messages in advertising. The message
of the antibrand is simple: if images can create a brand,
they can also destroy one.65 As the journalist Naomi Klein
recounts in her book, No Logo, the antibranding movement
operates at the cross-section between art, labor, and antiglobalization.66 By targeting companies that have invested
millions in building strong global brands, antibranders seek
to expose potential hypocrisy between corporate philosophy
and corporate activity to the average consumer.67 Antiand religious mechanisms that inform the actions of individuals); Christine
Harold, Pranking Rhetoric: “Culture Jamming” as Media Activism, 21 CRITICAL
STUD. MEDIA COMM. 189, 190 (2004) (also describing culture jammers); Dennis
Harvey, Popaganda: The Art & Crimes of Ron English, VARIETY, July 11-17,
2005, at 31 (reviewing a documentary detailing the billboard exploits of culture
jammer and artist Ron English); Katyal, supra note 17, at 503-09. For a typical
Billboard
Liberation
Front
work
see
for
example
http://www.billboardliberation.com/images/doomed/doomed_lrg.jpg;
http://www.billboardliberation.com/images/sappho/sappho_1_lrg.jpg.
62. See Paul Baines, A Pie in the Face (Cultural ‘Jamming’), ALTERNATIVES J.,
Mar. 22, 2001, at 14. The term was coined by the music band Negativland,
which uses audio and visual collage for the purposes of social commentary. In
Jamcon ‘84, a band member comments, “As awareness of how the media
environment we occupy affects and directs our inner life grows, some resist . . .
The skillfully reworked billboard . . . directs the public viewer to a consideration
of the original corporate strategy. The studio for the culture jammer is the world
at large.” See NEGATIVLAND, FAIR USE: THE STORY OF THE LETTER U AND THE
NUMERAL 2 (1995); Dery, supra note 49.
63. See Baines, supra note 62.
64. See Morris, supra note 60; see also Dery, supra note 59.
65. Dery, supra note 50.
66. NO LOGO, supra note 59.
67. Id.
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sweatshop movements were galvanized in 1992 when the
National Labor Committee performed an expose of
corporate and U.S. government subsidies of maquilas.68
Afterward, major labels like the GAP, Nike, Disney, and
Guess were forced to respond to consumer concerns about
their labor practices with partners in developing nations,
even though they had claimed only years earlier to be
“innocent global shoppers.”69
In addition to a growing concern about corporate social
responsibility, a second factor has added to the growth in
antibranding: the increasing force of “consumer
sovereignty,” which has led many consumers to respond and
publicize their complaints against particular corporations.70
These dynamics have reframed the relationship between
advertising and consumers into a much more dialogic
relationship, as opposed to a one-way relationship of
corporate inculcation. In many cases, antibranding activists
have decidedly turned to the advertising executives’ own
arsenal of tools to address consumer concerns, using
appropriative strategies to address the increasing
dominance of branding strategies in both private and public
space.
Finally, another key factor has also contributed to this
contestatory dynamic: technology. Digital technology and
the internet has created a world that makes copying,
pasting, and rebranding relatively simple tasks: something
that takes hours to create with paper and paintbrush now
takes minutes through the ease of graphic technology. And
messages are just as easy to disseminate, in seconds, to
thousands of individuals. In this way, the Internet has
effectively transformed the world of brands, trademarks and
68. Morris, supra note 60, at 26.
69. Id.
70. See Robert Lande, Consumer Choice as the Ultimate Goal of Antitrust, 62
UNIV. PITT. L. REV. 503, 503 (2001) (defining consumer sovereignty as “the state
of affairs where the consumer has the power to define his or her own wants”).
For more discussion on the role of the consumer, see Graeme W. Austin,
Trademarks and the Burdened Imagination, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 827 (2004);
Barton Beebe, Search and Persuasion in Trademark Law, 103 MICH. L. REV.
2020, 2025-26 (2005); Ralph S. Brown, Jr., Advertising and the Public Interest:
Legal Protection of Trade Symbols, 57 YALE L.J. 1165 (1948); Laura A.
Heymann, The Reasonable Person in Trademark Law, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 781,
785 (2008).
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symbols into something that is largely up for grabs; a
“semiotic democracy” that enables individuals to respond to
and reframe brand dominance.71
Given the investment that corporations make in
branding their identities and products, one could argue that
the simple act of antibranding in the marketplace can be
both devastating for trademark owners and deeply
empowering for critical consumers. Yet intellectual property
law is often caught between the need to protect the
intellectual property of a certain brand and the imperative
to allow for freedom of expression to flourish. The economic
arguments against antibranding are readily understood.
According to the traditional view, in order for a trademark
to have value, it must exist as separate and unique from all
other symbols; it must carry its own qualities that
distinguish it from other signs; but this conception of valuefrom-differentiation is somewhat different than the
utilitarian conception that has been historically associated
with brands.72 As applied to modern-day branding
philosophy, this conception of value turns on the notion of
brand equity and brand image, both of which draw from
intangible essences like corporate image, identity, and
brand personality.73
Antibranding, by its own admission, is designed to both
dissect and perhaps weaken the proffered message of the
advertisement. It introduces “noise” to the signal of the
corporate speaker, and instead suggests a wide array of less
desirable (but informative and often humorous)
connotations to the buyer. It adds potential costs to the
goodwill that is associated with a tightly constructed sign,
altering its meaning, and exposing—and potentially making
light of—certain hidden messages. In some cases, an
antibrand may actively dilute the meaning of a mark by
associating the mark, either with undesirable connotations,
71. See Giselle Fahimian, How the IP Guerillas Won: ®TMark, Adbusters,
Negativland, and the “Bullying Back” of Creative Freedom and Social
Commentary, in CENSORING CULTURE 132 (Robert Atkins & Svetlana Mintcheva
eds., 2006) (describing a semiotic democracy as “a society in which all persons
are able to participate in the generation and circulation of cultural meaningmaking”). See generally Yochai Benkler, Freedom in the Commons: Towards a
Political Economy of Information, 52 DUKE L.J. 1245 (2003).
72. See Beebe, supra note 70, at 642.
73. See Desai, supra note 43.
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or with an entirely different issue or product, raising issues
of tarnishment, as well as potential blurring as well. In
short, an antibrand performs all of the same functions that
a traditional trademark performs—it offers information and
signals certain qualities, and it is also expressive of a
particular philosophy. In other words, it functions just like
any other brand, except that it derives its value, not from
differentiation, but from similarity to another brand, and by
communicating—and recoding—a particular message that
an original brand represents.
But while traditional advertising directs itself towards
building further economic value, an antibrand aims towards
the opposite result. Antibranding uses the same arsenal of
weapons as advertising—language and image—to flip the
social meaning of a brand. By employing speech and visual
expression and exploiting the instability of the brander’s
reliance on an unstable medium, antibranding offers the
consumer a different way to construct the dialogue, even
while still using the brand philosophy and image. The
message may be separate and distinct from the original
corporate brand message, but it still converges with the
mark because it uses the trademark or the sign in order to
communicate a particular message. In doing so, a
trademark transgresses its own identity as a vessel for
corporate identity and property, and instead, arguably,
becomes remade into something else, an antibrand—
constituting expressive speech, a satire, or at other times, a
parody.
Because it is most often connected to a particular
message, rather than a certain product, an antibrand
demonstrates how a trademark can become transformed
from a commodifiable property—part of the marketplace of
goods—into a symbolic expression within the marketplace of
speech. Rather than existing within a marketplace of goods
that derives value from a brand’s association with a product
or corporation, the antibrand participates in the
marketplace of ideas that derives its value from its
expressive commentary on the brand instead. This
transition, from brand to antibrand, and thus from
trademark into speech, in turn highlights another key
difference: even though trademark law (by protecting the
mark’s stability of essence and identity) suggests that a
mark is immutable, the First Amendment’s protection of
consumer commentary suggests that trademarks are indeed
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B. Early Treatments of Antibranding
As some of my earlier work suggested with respect to
copyright law, courts have tended to protect the polarities of
expression that appropriates from prior texts.74 Copyright
law tends to protect individuals who either adopt or oppose
(transform) particular context. Within copyright law, works
that assimilate previous texts are considered derivative;
works that transform previous texts are considered to be
fair uses. Yet the law has little to say about encouraging the
kind of creativity that falls between these two poles.75 While
the fair use doctrine offers some protection for
transformative works, under the law’s treatment of
creativity, Hall’s third category, that of negotiation, seems
to receive less protection even though it represents an
important facet of audience participation and creative
interactivity.76
Consider satire as one example. In Campbell v. AcuffRose Music, Inc.,77 the Supreme Court held that some types
of parody could be protected if they transformed the original
work. Yet the Court drew a firm line between parody and
satire, noting that whereas “[p]arody needs to mimic an
original to make its point . . . satire can stand on its own
two feet and so requires justification for the very act of
borrowing.”78 In practice, however, this distinction is
unworkable. As Robert Merges has persuasively argued,
using a copyrighted work as a vehicular tool rather than as
a target for commentary and criticism is even more
deserving of fair use protections because it serves the goal of

74. Katyal, supra note 17.
75. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enters. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394,
1401 (9th Cir. 1997) (finding that a book about the O.J. Simpson trial did not
transform Seuss’s original work); MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d.
Cir. 1981) (noting that a parody of a song was not transformative of the
original).
76. See Hall, supra note 45 and accompanying text.
77. 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
78. Id. at 580-81.
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promoting more commentary on larger social issues.79 Yet,
curiously, copyright law draws a firm line between parody
and satire, dividing the marketplace into two oppositional
polarities, one protected and one arguably prohibited.
When one considers the wide range of commentaries
that antibranding usually involves, especially in the
trademark context, it often becomes difficult to tell whether
those commentaries comprise protected parody, less
protected satire, or whether it comprises actionable dilution.
Antibrands take on many forms, some which address a
brand directly, and some which use a brand for the purpose
of commentary on another subject. Nevertheless, it is also
important to consider how trademark law has changed over
time to address these variations. As Hannibal Travis has
described, trademark law, as it developed, slowly began to
abandon “passing off” as a requirement, setting the stage
for credible litigation against a wider variety of
unauthorized uses.80 By the 1980s, a variety of cases
broadened the definition of infringement to include uses
that might suggest either affiliation or sponsorship, which
became especially numerous given the wide proliferation of
corporate sponsorships in non-advertising content, such as
films, editorial magazines, and the like.81
At the same time that brand sponsorships began to seep
into forms of media like films and novels, unauthorized
brand references also began to creep into the commercial
domain, raising issues of tarnishment in the marketplace of
goods. This trend was perhaps best represented by the
famed Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders case, which involved a
pornographic film in which the main character’s outfit, a
Dallas Cheerleaders uniform, was considered to be
infringing.82 The Dallas Cowboys case served as an early
example of how courts dealt with unauthorized brand
references, setting a tone that suggested that such
79. Robert P. Merges, Are You Making Fun of Me? Notes on Market Failure
and the Parody Defense in Copyright, 21 AM. INTELL. PROP. L. ASS’N Q.J. 305,
311-12 (1993); see also Sheldon N. Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic
Rationale For Copyright, 11 CONN. L. REV. 615 (1979); Richard A. Posner, When
Is Parody Fair Use?, 21 J. LEGAL STUD. 67 (1992).
80. See Travis, supra note 57, at 14.
81. Id.
82. See Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200 (2d Cir. 1979).
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references deserved injunctive relief, even if they were used
for expressive or referential purposes, or within
nontraditionally commercial formats like film. By the 1990s,
the trend towards trademark expansion continued, leading
courts to enjoin use of a company name on union materials83
and the use of the term Delta Airlines by a retiree
association of the company.84 One court enjoined use of the
Pink Panther name by a gay activist group on the grounds
that the name would confuse the association with the movie
character by the same name.85
While some of these uses may have been more
referential or nominative in nature, others began to take on
the dimensions of an antibrand by offering social and
political commentary on other subjects. Again, however,
courts often failed to extend protection. The Eighth Circuit
instituted an injunction against a parody ad appearing in a
humor magazine called “Michelob Oily,” which stated: “At
the rate it’s being dumped into our oceans, lakes and rivers,
you’ll drink it oily sooner or later, anyway.”86 The ad was
made in reference to an oil spill that poisoned the water
source for the beer factory, and was accompanied by a
disclaimer for the purposes of dispelling confusion.

83. Travis, supra note 57, at 23 (citing Brach Van Houten Holding, Inc. v.
Save Brach’s Coalition for Chicago, 856 F. Supp. 472 (N.D. Ill. 1994)).
84. Id. at 24 (citing Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Hudson, 868 F. Supp. 1383 (N.D.
Ga. 1994)).
85. Id. (citing MGM-Pathe Communications Co. v. Pink Panther Patrol, 774
F. Supp. 869 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
86. Id. at 25-26 (citing Anheuser-Busch v. Balducci Publ’ns, 28 F.3d 769, 772
(8th Cir. 1994)). Travis lists an impressive array of other cases that included
parodic, critical, or ‘nominal’ references to trademarks litigated during this
period: parody baseball cards; a Muppet named “Spa’am”; T-shirts that read
“Just Did It” with a swoosh symbol; beach towels bearing the logo, “This Beach
is For You”; “Spy Notes” parodies of the Cliffs' Notes format and works of fiction;
“Lardashe” designer jeans for large-sized consumers, poking fun at the term
“Jordache”; an “L.L. Beam Back-To-School Sex Catalog” magazine insert; a
“Donkey Kong” Nintendo game; a humanizing parody of Superman in a
television series called “Greatest American Hero”; a portable toilet called
“Here’s Johnny”; Sears’ “Bagzilla” garbage bags; a caricature of utility
companies’ advertising in publications critical of their practices; a speech in
opposition to the strategic defense initiative, a military program, that used the
phrase “Star Wars”; and parody T-shirts picturing “Miami Mice.” Travis, supra
note 57, at 25.
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Other cases handed down reached similar conclusions,
though at other times, the results varied widely: a court
permitted an environmental groups’ use of a character
called “Reddy Kilowatt,” owned by an electrical utility
company, even though the character was used on a
pamphlet criticizing the electric company’s policies.87 The
court firmly rejected a constitutional First Amendment
defense. According to the court, the defendant had argued
that the trademark constituted “the functional equivalent of
public property either because it is generic or because
plaintiff has exposed it to the ‘marketplace of ideas’ with
respect to the debate over public utilities.” The court
rejected this argument, concluding that “no open ended
invitation to the public [exists] to use [plaintiff's property]
for any and all purposes, however incompatible with the
interests of both [the plaintiff] and the [customers] whom
they serve,” arguing that the appearance of the trademark
in the marketplace of ideas did not convert it from property
into speech.88 Interestingly, it still permitted the mark’s
appropriation on the grounds that it did not confuse the
public.
In short, the outcomes of these cases were not easily
reconciled. Some of these uses, like Reddy, enjoyed
protection on the grounds that they did not create a
likelihood of confusion. Another court similarly permitted
the use of the Olympic symbol (with prison bars
superimposed on the symbol) to protest a planned
conversion of an Olympic Village at Lake Placid into a
prison,89 and yet another allowed the appropriation of
Smokey the Bear’s image in fliers protesting the U.S. Forest
Service.90 In another case, involving a labor dispute at a
restaurant, a defendant union created fliers that parodied
the plaintiff’s trademark and listed violations by a health
inspector.91 The Fifth Circuit rejected a likelihood of
87. Reddy Communications, Inc. v. Environmental Action Foundation, Inc.,
199 U.S.P.Q. 630 (D.D.C. 1977).
88. Id.
89. Stop the Olympic Prison v. USOC, 489 F .Supp. 1112 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
90. See Lighthawk, the Environmental Airforce v. Robertson, 812 F. Supp.
1095 (W.D. Wash. 1993).
91. WHS Entertainment Ventures v. United Paperworkers Int’l Union, 997 F.
Supp. 946, 947, 952 (M.D. Tenn. 1998).
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confusion, arguing that “no reasonable person would believe
that one would purposefully distribute a flyer containing a
listing of its health food violations—even as a part of a
distasteful or unconventional advertising campaign.”92
At other times, however, courts acted swiftly to enjoin
expression that commented on particular brands and
organizations, particularly in the early days of domain
name litigation, where courts broadly construed commercial
uses even when there was an expressive dimension to the
commentary.93 Some courts found the risk of diversion
unacceptable where the mark was used in connection with
the sale of goods and services, demonstrating that it was
designed to, and therefore likely to, prevent some Internet
users from reaching the official website of the corporation.94
The most famous of these cases involves a case from the
Fourth Circuit, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals
v. Doughney, in which a person purchased the website
www.peta.org for an organization called “people eating tasty
animals.”95 Doughney claimed that the site was used to
create a parody of People for the Ethical Treatment of
Animals, and described the site as a “resource for those who
enjoy eating meat, wearing fur and leather, hunting, and
the fruits of scientific research.96 The site also offered
hyperlinks to various sites that offered meat, fur, leather,
hunting, and animal research, among other things.97
Doughney defended his activities, claiming that his site was
constitutionally-protected
parody
under
the
First
Amendment. In assessing these claims, the court held that
the site did not constitute protected parody because the site
did not convey two simultaneous and contradictory
messages. While the court conceded that some initial
confusion is necessary for a parody to be effective, an
effective parody will diminish the risk of confusion “by
conveying [only] just enough of the original design to allow
92. Id. at 952.
93. Barrett, supra note 57; Lipton, supra note 57.
94. See Faegre & Benson LLP v. Purdy, No. 03-6472, 2004 WL 167570, at *2
(D. Minn. Jan. 5, 2004).
95. See 263 F.3d 359, 362-63 (4th Cir. 2001).
96. Id. at 363. The site also asked the viewer whether he or she was “Feeling
lost? Offended? Perhaps you should, like, exit immediately.” Id.
97. Id.
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the consumer to appreciate the point of parody.”98 The court
concluded:
Looking at Doughney’s domain name alone, there is no suggestion
of a parody. The domain name peta.org simply copies PETA’s
mark, conveying the message that it is related to PETA. The
domain name does not convey the second, contradictory message
needed to establish a parody—a message that the domain name is
not related to PETA, but that it is a parody of PETA.99

The appropriation of the domain name as a source
identifier, for the court, effectively foreclosed it from use for
other purposes, even alternative commentaries.100
Moreover, the court found clear evidence of commercial
intent on skimpy evidence; namely: (1) the defendant linked
to sites that sold certain products, (2) because prospective
supporters of PETA might be diverted from finding the
correct site and he intended to mislead potential consumers
who were seeking the legitimate PETA site; (3) he offered to
settle with PETA; and (4) because he had also registered
other domain names that reflected the use of other’s marks
or likenesses.
Further, consider the impact of these findings,
particularly in comparison to the Court’s definition of
commercial speech. The site did not do “no more than
propose a commercial transaction,” which comprises the
classic definition of commercial speech.101 Nowhere did the
site purport to sell various items on its own; its only
98. Id.
99. Id. at 360. In a similar case, Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, an
individual purchased a host of websites that used the trademarks of the aforementioned law firm, Morrison and Foerster, along with dozens of other law
firms. The various websites Wick set up displayed a number of messages like,
“We’re your paid friends!”; “Best Friends Money Can Buy”; “Greed is Good”; “We
Bend Over for You . . . because You Bend Over for Us!”; “Parasites . . . No Soul .
. . No Conscience . . . No Spine . . . No Problem.” The court rejected Wick’s
parody defense, and held instead that Mr. Wicks’s use of the law firm’s mark in
his domain name did not convey two simultaneous and contradictory messages,
but only produced confusion. 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1132-33 (D. Colo. 2000)
“Because his websites rely on confusion to convey their points, Mr. Wick’s
argument that his use of the mark as a parody fails.” Id. at 1135.
100. 263 F.3d at 369.
101. Va. St. Bd. of Pharm. v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 728,
776 (1976) (establishing the definition of commercial speech).
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evidence of commercial intent involved the site owner’s
referral to other, conspicuously commercial websites. Nor
did the defendant’s desire to confuse or divert customers of
PETA demonstrate a clear commercial intent. Yet, many
courts mistakenly reached similar conclusions by relying, in
part, upon the principle of “initial interest confusion,” which
facilitated the finding of trademark infringement or dilution
even when the parody or gripe site offered a clarifying
disclaimer or clearly stated that it was not endorsed by the
original company.102
Cases like PETA have a strong impact on antibranding
practices, raising obvious risks of chilling consumer
commentary and parody. In many of these cases, the
appropriation of a brand—even for antibranding, parodic, or
satirical purposes—can become especially vulnerable if
commercial use is broadly construed. Consider another
example. The Starbucks logo, as most of us know, consists of
a green and white graphic depiction of a mermaid, which is
emblazoned on countless Starbucks items, including cups,
napkins, apparel, mugs, ice creams, coffees, and other
assorted retail items.103 In classic antibranding fashion,
cartoonist Kieron Dwyer reworked the logo extensively, first
by anatomically enhancing it, adding a navel ring as well as
a cellular phone, opening the mermaid’s eyes, and then by
replacing the words “Starbucks Coffee” with the words
“Consumer Whore.”104 The stars are replaced with dollar
signs.105 And some versions of the parody include the slogan
“Buy More Now” underneath the logo.106
Although well aware that there were some risks of a
lawsuit involved in his logo, Dwyer insisted on publishing
his work on the cover of his comic magazine, and selling a
102. Initial interest confusion has been described as a “bait and switch that
allows infringing producers to impact the purchasing decisions of consumers by
confusing them, and thereby allowing the competitor to get its foot in the door.”
Northland Ins. Cos. v. Blaylock, 115 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1119 (D. Minn. 2000). See
Jennifer Rothman, Initial Interest Confusion: Standing at the Crossroads of
Trademark Law, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 105 (2005).
103. See Sarah Mayhew Schlosser, Note, The High Price of (Criticizing) Coffee:
The Chilling Effect of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act on Corporate Parody,
43 ARIZ. L. REV. 931, 937-38 (2001).
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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few t-shirts along the way.107 Soon after, he was faced with
a suit from Starbucks alleging copyright infringement,
trademark infringement, and dilution. The suit contended
that the logo was “sexually offensive” and would tarnish the
trademark by associating it with what many consumers will
consider lewd, immoral, and unacceptable.108
The court’s approach in resolving this case typifies the
difficulty courts have with integrating antibranding
artworks into the doctrinal categories of the past. While the
court rejected Starbucks’ trademark and copyright
infringement claims on the grounds that the mark
represented protected parody and fair use, the court
ultimately granted an injunction against further publication
on the grounds that the parody tarnished Starbucks’ image,
thus constituting dilution.109 In other words, the parody’s
negative, humorous association had to be enjoined, simply,
because it worked successfully in alleging the subtle
motivations behind the Starbucks enterprise.
Central to the Starbucks ruling was the judge’s finding
that Dwyer’s work constituted commercial use of a mark,
given his sale of the mark on various shirts and comic
books. In other words, the court concluded that Dwyer’s
work constituted parody, and perhaps constitutionally
protected parody, but only if it remained noncommercial.
Once the recoded logo was sold on various items—mugs, tshirts, comic books—the work was transformed from a piece
of parasitic art to a competitive commodity that tarnished
the original, pristine Starbucks image.110 The injunction
barred Dwyer from selling the image, even on comic books,
and on any website that contains both editorial commentary
and a separate linked page of merchandise for sale.111
107. Schlosser, supra note 103, at 940.
108. See Comic Book Legal Defense Fund, CBLDF Case Files – Starbucks v.
Dwyer, available at http://cbldf.org/about-us/case-files/dwyer/. For more info on
Dwyer’s anti-Starbucks crusade, see Kieron Dwyer, Sued by the Siren, Pt. 1:
Confessions of a Frap-addict, available at http://www.tmcm.com/pages/mag_
content/tm0/sued_pt1.html.
109. Schlosser, supra note 103, at 940 (noting that the parody could conjure
“in the minds of consumers negative associations that clash with those
generated by Starbucks’ use of the mermaid logo”).
110. Id.
111. Id.
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Although Dwyer was initially permitted to keep the logo on
his website, the court later barred him from doing so and
the case eventually settled after Dwyer found himself
unable to find financial assistance for the trial and
appeals.112
This case is a particularly powerful example of how the
law’s divergence between commercial and non-commercial
speech has a determinative impact on the outcome of a
dispute. 113 The outcome suggests a significant departure
from First Amendment protection for expressive
commentary, and it also suggests a radical expansion of
commercial speech in the trademark domain. As the
Starbucks case suggests, courts might enjoin an antibrand
even when a court finds no risk of infringement or
likelihood of confusion. The crux of this determination rests
on the fact that the antibrand, like the Starbucks brand,
can be sold—since it appeared on goods, such as cups, Tshirts, mugs, and the like—it was deemed less likely to
deserve protection than the same logo circulated without a
profit motive. In some cases, courts regularly distinguish
between antibrands that are sold versus those that are not,
even though the political impact of the antibrand might be
identical whether it is sold as a good or whether it is
circulated throughout the marketplace of speech.
112. Id. at 941.
113. To offer another example, in one case, a defendant marketed various
goods—coffee mugs, T-shirts—with the phrase “Mutant of Omaha,” to convey an
anti-nuclear war message by creating a parody of the trademark Mutual of
Omaha. The court ruled:
There are numerous ways in which [defendant] may express his
aversion to nuclear war without infringing on a trademark in the
process. Just as [defendant] may not hold an anti-nuclear rally in
his neighbor’s backyard without permission, neither may he voice
his concerns through the improper use of Mutual’s registered
trademark. Under these facts, the first amendment proves no
defense.
Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co. v. Novak, 648 F. Supp. 905, 911 (D. Neb. 1986). On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that the visual parody offered by the artist
deserved less protection than a possible editorial parody. Mutual of Omaha Ins.
Co. v. Novak, 836 F.2d 397, 402 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that the injunction “in no
way infringes upon the constitutional protection the First Amendment would
provide were [the artist] to present an editorial parody in a book, magazine, or
film”).
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Although more recent cases have been much more
protective of the antibrand, a point I discuss further in Part
IV, these earlier cases signify, at the very least, some risk of
chilling antibranding projects and expression. Each case
raises similar questions about the proper line that should be
drawn between parody, satire, and other forms of protected
expression. When does a reference to a brand or other form
of protected work comprise protected speech, and when does
it constitute unacceptable dilution? A similar question is
impressively posed in Lisa Ramsey’s piece in this
Symposium, which explores the growing phenomenon of
individuals registering brands on Twitter and Facebook, a
phenomenon that she calls ‘brandjacking.’114 In many of the
cases that she details, it is not always entirely clear that the
use of the brand is for the purposes of parody or
commentary, and at times, it appears to move further and
further towards unauthorized impersonation, particularly if
the public is likely to be confused and may be harmed by the
confusion.115
III. STEALTH AND SPONSORSHIP
Antibrands force the law to perform a difficult balancing
act, traversing the boundaries of both the First Amendment
and the law of intellectual property. But today, the
antibrand—its mixture of humor, satire, and parody,
sometimes successful, sometimes not—has both directly and
indirectly influenced the development of branding and
advertising. Today, marketing experts have replicated the
irony and humor of the antibrand as a key tool in coming up
with new forms of advertising. As consumers have grown
more and more overloaded with information, advertisers
have been forced to seek out more creative ways to
communicate their messages to the public. This expansion
indirectly influences the antibrand. As sponsored product
placement grows more powerful, unsponsored references
shrink in both stature and visibility. As the law sorts out
the boundaries between commercial and noncommercial
114. Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark
Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 851 (2010).
115. See an example offered by Ramsey where someone set up a ‘Nine-West
Model Auditions’ page on Facebook and solicited photographs of their faces,
bodies, and feet to a site with their contact information. Id. at 853-54.
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speech, often by reference to user-generated content,
advertising strategies continue to develop at breakneck
speed, constantly inventing new ways to connect to the
consumer. The best example of this trend involves the dual
rise of stealth marketing, peer promotions, and product
placement in both real and digital space.116
Many people often fail to recognize that behind many
brand appearances in a motion picture, music video,
television show, video game, and even, at times, a website,
lies a carefully negotiated product placement agreement
that ensures that the brand appear natural and nonadvertised in nature. ‘“When a character is in a kitchen and
there are Doritos on the counter or someone’s in a mall and
they pass a Coca-Cola sign, [those brands] don’t just happen
to be there,”’ says one marketing expert. ‘“Everything is
carefully placed—it’s a constructed reality.”’117 In many
forms of content, the vast shadow of the world of product
placement transforms ordinary references to brands and
copyrighted media into licensing opportunities.
Consider another example, also from Wayne’s World.
Few people realize that the unforgettable opening notes to
the song, Stairway to Heaven, were also supposed to make
an appearance in the film, in a scene where Garth attempts
to play the song in a music store. After the film’s theatrical
release in the United States, however, the opening bars of
the song were removed from the international, cable, and
videotape releases. Why? Because the movie studio was
unable to secure the proper copyright licenses for the song’s
opening notes. As a result, any inclusion of the song meant
that the makers of the film risked violating the laws of
copyright every time the film was shown. So the song was
removed.
As one commentator noted, fans of the song “must
accept the excision of this song . . . as a natural occurrence,
no different than a commercial interruption or product
placement.”118 The author is making an important point,
116. See Ellen P. Goodman, Peer Promotion and False Advertising Law, 58
S.C. L. REV. 683, 685 (2007).
117. See Julie Mehta, NOT Buying IT, CURRENT HEALTH, Vol. 32, Issue 6, 1013 (Feb. 2006) (quoting Lynda Bergsma, President of the Alliance for a Media
Literate America).
118. Rowin, supra note 10.
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suggesting that the flip side of product placement involves
the excision, or removal, of content that is not licensed from
mainstream media. As a result, what the viewer sees as a
“natural” appearance of a brand is actually the product of
an explicit licensing agreement between the copyright or
trademark owner, and the studio that is producing the
motion picture (or music video). In other words, as a result
of product placement, almost every brand reference we
see—in movies, songs, and music videos—turns out to be
sponsored, but the viewer does not always realize that this
is the case.
In Ellen Goodman’s landmark article, Stealth
Marketing and Editorial Integrity,119 published in the Texas
Law Review, she describes two kinds of stealth marketing.
The first kind involves “conventional payola,” or pay-forplay broadcasting, which typically involves the purchase of
audience exposure to the promotional item.120 It resembles
the use of slotting fees in retail stores, supermarkets, and
book stores, to sell items in a prominent place. The other
kind of stealth marketing explored by Goodman involves
“immersive” or “embedded” advertising, and in this type of
promotional activity, the products are part of the content.
Product placement falls squarely into this realm, along with
branded entertainment or sponsored journalism, all of
which cloak a desire for publicity by concealing its
sponsorship for the purpose of subtlety. Goodman details
the vast rise of product placement, all the way from the use
of Reese’s Pieces in the movie E.T. to between 1999 and
2004, where the average advertising dollar share
attributable to product placement jumped, on average, to
twenty-one percent a year.121
Since the cost of movie promotion has also skyrocketed,
more and more movie studios are turning to product
placement as a profitable means to recoup some of their
costs. One documentary, Behind the Screens, details the
lucrative prospects of cross-merchandising, tie-ins, and
merchandising—Pampers’ paid $50,000 for its products to
appear in Three Men and a Baby; Cuervo Gold paid
119. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L.
REV. 83, 89 (2006).
120. Id.
121. See id. at 93-94.
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$150,000 to appear in Tequila Sunrise; Exxon paid $300,000
to appear in Days of Thunder, and there was a bidding war
over which business magazine would make its appearance
in the film Wall Street.122 Today, television studios consider
using reality shows as vehicles to sponsor product
placement; videogames offer multiple opportunities;
individuals sponsor viral videos on products on YouTube
(with or without official sponsorship); product placement
sponsors sit in on editorial meetings for television and new
media; and advertisers themselves produce their own
entertainment (called ‘brandvertising’ or ‘advertainment’).123
In the film Up in the Air, the audience saw heavily placed
product placement from American Airlines and Hilton
Hotels—the deal, apparently, was that the airline and hotel
companies paid for hotel stays and airline rentals for the
cast and crew—all in exchange for some prominence within
the film.124
Section 317 of the Communications Act requires
broadcasters to disclose the identity of sponsors, but in the
case of product placement, it is not necessary to disclose so
long as “it is clear that the mention of the name of the
product constitutes a sponsorship identification,” and the
122. See BEHIND THE SCREENS (Media Education Foundation 2000), available
at
http://www.brandhype.org/MovieMapper/Resources/BehindTheScreens.jsp;
see also Ronald Grover, I Can Make Your Product a Star, BUSINESSWEEK, July 2,
2009,
at
68,
available
at
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/09_28/b4139068367113.htm;
Stuart Kemp, UKFC, Film Tree Team for Ad-Funded Finance, HOLLYWOOD
REPORTER,
Dec.
1,
2009,
available
at
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/hr/content_display/world/news/e3icc2aee7197
7fdb176550a1d97b94ef82; Marcy Medina, Summer Movies, Fashion and Profits,
WOMEN’S WEAR DAILY, May 3, 2006, available at http://www.wwd.com/fashionnews/summer-movies-fashion-profits-536925; Joel Russel, Ad-Ventures in Film
Financing: Adidas Deal to Bankroll Trilogy of Soccer Movies Elevates Concept
but Raises Concerns over Control, 28 L.A. BUS. J. 14 (2006), available at
http://www.labusinessjournal.com/news/2006/jun/19/ad-ventures-in-film-financi
ng/; T.L. Stanley, 'Star Trek' Film Beams Up BK, Kellogg, BRANDWEEK, Apr. 17,
2009,
available
at
http://www.brandweek.com/bw/content_display/esearch/e3i76c769b73ce8515865
c29004f7961198?pn=1.
123. For more information on these strategies and their effects on public
discourse, see Goodman, supra note 119, at 95-96.
124. See Alex Fascilla, Co-op Advertising the Product Placement Way!, Balihoo,
Feb. 5, 2010, available at http://marketing.balihoo.com/blog/co-op-marketingsoftware/0/0/co-op-advertising-the-product-placement-way.

828

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

sponsorship disclosure rules do not apply unless the sponsor
has paid for its promotion (which explains why the
donations of flight and hotel accommodations in Up in the
Air were so perfectly calculated).125 Although sponsorship
disclosure rules became strengthened after a widely
publicized payola scandal in the late 1950s, a wide degree of
confusion persists as to how these rules apply to
sponsorship within new media, and also marketing
strategies that blur the line between sponsorship and
entertainment.
The law’s failure to regulate product placement, I would
respectfully suggest, also helps to explain precisely why the
practice can be so effective. Its subtle strategies also become
especially useful for an advertiser as an indirect result of
the rise of the antibrand, which has, in part, fueled the rise
of consumer cynicism, making stealth or guerrilla
marketing techniques seem even more attractive, as
opposed to direct, face-to-face advertising. “People these
days,” one advertiser argues (currently engaged in
designing a viral marketing campaign called “Sweet,” to
rebrand corn syrup), “don’t respond to commercials.
Traditional advertising doesn’t speak their language, so
we’re trying to come up with new ways” of communication.126
The new generation of product placement is actually far
more subtle than the previous generation’s strategies.
Snapple Beverages partners with Fox Sport’s extreme sport
show to require that the host and all guests consume the
beverage on set while its logo appears on the screen.127
Companies have propped up throughout Hollywood,
combing scripts for branding and tie-in opportunities.128
“The concept of integration is a big push,” one marketing
firm vice president reports. “There are a lot of corporations
that realize being integrated from a product placement
125. Goodman, supra note 119, at 98.
126. UnNews, Corn Refiners Association Launches Viral Marketing Campaign
for HFCS, Sept. 11, 2008, http://uncyclopedia.wikia.com/wiki/UnNews:Corn_
Refiners_Association_launches_viral_marketing_campaign_for_HFCS.
127. Mark R. Greer, Going Hollywood: Beverage Companies are Dealing with
Advertising Overload with Less Traditional Tie-Ins, COMMERCIAL ALERT, Apr.
30, 2003, available at http://www.commercialalert.org/issues/culture/productplacement/going-hollywood-beverage-companies-are-dealing-with-advertisingoverload-with-less-traditional-tie-ins-marketing.
128. Id.
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standpoint has a greater value than a 30-second spot. . . .
Irrespective of what ad agencies tell you, there’s a falloff in
commercial. People get up, they change the channel and
TiVo gets around commercials altogether, so by being
integrated into the program, you have a large captive
audience—and an interested one.”129 Big Fat Promotions, a
stealth marketing company in New York City, claims that it
has paid individuals in bars to talk up a certain liquor,
doormen to prominently place packages from an online
children’s retailer in a building entryway, and mothers to
talk about a new laundry detergent at baseball games.130
Even the Wayne’s World example of ‘self parodying irony,’
with the subtle payoffs of product placement, is often the
goal of a successful marketing campaign, desired in press,
on film, or on the Web.
This creates a convergence of opposites. At the same
time that brand value has skyrocketed, and as advertising
continues to comprise the link between the brand and the
product to the public, we see more and more examples of
consumer cynicism and “information overload.”131 Saddled
with these trends, advertisers are forced to explore new
channels of communication, often leading advertisers to
poke fun at their own industries, just as Wayne’s World did.
At times, the branded entertainment borrows the
messaging from a classic antibrand parody or approach, like
Dove’s Evolution video, where it showed the artificiality of
the beauty industry by showing the transformation of a
blond model from everyday girl into gorgeous model,
through hundreds and hundreds of screenshots of makeup,
129. Id.
130. See Daniel Eisenberg & Laura Bradford, Its an Ad, Ad, Ad World, TIME,
Sept. 2, 2002 at 38-41.
131. Claire Beale, On Advertising: Consumers Will Shape Brands in 2010,
INDEPENDENT
(UK),
Jan.
4,
2010,
available
at
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/advertising/claire-beale-on-advertisin
g-consumers-will-shape-brands-in-2010-1856669.html; Michael Bush, In Age of
Friending, Consumers Trust Their Friends Less, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 8, 2010,
available at http://adage.com/article?article_id=141972; Brian Morrissey,
Forrester: Consumers Distrust Corporate Blogs, ADWEEK, Dec. 9, 2008, available
at http://www.adweek.com/aw/content_display/news/digital/e3i4bd301b9abd26e
41d2a4fc3b30731040; Rob Walker, Faux Logo, N.Y. TIMES, May 14, 2006,
(Magazine),
available
at
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/14/magazine/14wwln_consumed.html?ex=1305
259200&en=02fdfa03b0cee421&ei=5088&partner=rssnyt&emc=rss.
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hair, and Photoshop additions, ending the ad with the
(seemingly wise observation) “No wonder our perception of
beauty is distorted.”132
Dove’s ad is but a single example of a massive shift in
advertising content. Today, in cyberspace and real space,
advertisers attempt to blend the boundaries between the
brand and the antibrand, often by drawing strategies like
parody, where companies often poke fun at themselves or a
competitor:
· Ask.com instituted its own guerrilla marketing
campaign against Google when it set up ads that said,
“STOP THE ONLINE INFORMATION MONOPOLY,”
which directs you to a site called the Information Revolution
owned by Ask’s ad agency.133
· Mozilla set up its own anti-Internet Explorer website,
called Fight Against Boredom, and which has a fake talk
show setup and fake Facebook page, all designed to promote
Firefox against Internet Explorer.134
A second strategy involves recoding in real space, where
the line between guerrilla art and guerrilla advertising is
swiftly disappearing, making it hard to tell what’s branded,
and what’s been antibranded.135 Public space becomes
littered with messaging that is both corporately sponsored,
and non-corporately sponsored, making it difficult for the
law to govern each separately. Sony hired graffiti artists in
urban cities to spray-paint buildings with images of kids
playing with their PSPs, Rockstar did the same to promote
its Warriors game for the PSP;136 and Smirnoff faced charge
132. See Dove Evolution, http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iYhCn0jf46U (last
visited May 4, 2010).
133. Posting of Danny Sullivan to Search Engine Land, Ask’s Guerrilla
Marketing Campaign Against Google, http://searchengineland.com/asksguerilla-marketing-campaign-against-google-10731 (Mar. 14, 2007, 13:18 EST).
134. Duncan Riley, Exclusive: Mozilla Secretly Launches a Viral Campaign for
Firefox, Jan. 7, 2008, http://techcrunch.com/2008/01/07/exclusive-mozillasecretly-launches-a-viral-campaign-for-firefox/.
135. Posting of Delana to WebUrbanist, Guerrilla Art Versus Guerrilla
Advertising: What’s the Difference?, http://weburbanist.com/2008/07/03/guerrillaart-versus-guerrilla-advertising-whats-the-difference/ (July 3, 2008).
136. Posting of Boy of Tomorrow to GayGamer.net, Rockstar Employs Graffiti
in Warriors’ Guerilla Marketing Campaign, http://gaygamer.net/2007/02
/rockstars_employs_graffiti_in.html (Feb. 10, 2007); Ryan Singel, Sony Draws
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of ‘vandalism’ after it decorated a busy underpass in order
to promote its new alcoholic drink to the younger public in
the United Kingdom;137 IBM’s advertising agency spray
painted Linux advertisements in the cities of Chicago and
San Francisco (leading to $120,000 in fines).138 In another
example, a person posting guerrilla advertisements for
Microsoft’s Zune was detained by police in Austin, TX for
posting them illegally.139 The irony is that guerrilla artists
face harsh criminal repercussions from their work,
including imprisonment, while guerrilla advertising
campaigns face, for the most part, fines, an observation that
has compelled groups like the Graffiti Research Lab and the
Anti-Advertising Agency to draw attention to the sheer
number of illegal ads in urban spaces.140
The line between the two—guerrilla art and
advertising—and the boundaries of each, begin to blur as a
result. In a notorious stunt in 2007, a variety of LED signs
to promote the television show Aqua Teen Hunger Force
were taken to be explosive devices, ushering in a citywide
bomb scare throughout Boston.141 (Other reports suggested
that the youth of Boston felt differently, immediately
recognizing it for what it was: a viral marketing
campaign.)142 Was it advertising, performance art, or
something else? Consider one blogger’s observation:
You might think that the distinction between the two [art and
advertising] would be obvious. After all, the goal of advertising is
to sell you something, while the goal of art is less easy to define.
Ire With PSP Graffiti, WIRED, Dec. 5, 2005, http://www.wired.com/cultur
e/lifestyle/news/2005/12/69741.
137. Guerilla Marketing Examples: How Not to Do It, BIZHELP24, Oct. 19,
2005, http://www.bizhelp24.com/marketing/guerrilla-marketing-examples-how-n
ot-to-do-it.html [hereinafter Guerilla Marketing Examples].
138. Singel, supra note 136.
139. Posting of Urbanist to WebUrbanist, 5 Great Examples of Guerilla
Marketing Gone Wrong: Olympic Belly-Flops to the Boston Globe Scare,
http://weburbanist.com/2008/05/06/5-great-examples-of-guerilla-marketing-gone
-wrong-from-olympic-fumbles-to-bomb-scares/ (May 6, 2008).
140. Posting of Steve Lambert to Anti-Advertising Agency, Light Criticism,
http://antiadvertisingagency.com/2007/01/23/light-criticism/ (Jan. 23, 2007).
141. Urbanist, supra note 139.
142. See Michael Levenson & Maria Cramer, Marketing Gambit Exposes a
Wide Generation Gap, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb. 1, 2007, at A1.
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Guerrilla art states a political message, subverts a common belief,
[and] exists simply for the pleasure of the beholder, or any
number of other reasons. . . . But what about advertisements that
are truly beautiful? What about the street artists who are paid to
use their art to advertise a product? Is that still advertising, or
can it also be art? Street art that isn’t commissioned and for which
the artist hasn’t received permission may very well be a
143
masterpiece, but in the eyes of the law it is a criminal offense.

Third, in both cyberspace and real space, increasingly,
more and more advertisers are relying on explicit consumer
generated content—or mimicking such strategies—to
circulate their messages to the public. Peer promotions are
relied upon—wikis, blogs, Facebook, Twitter, MySpace, and
YouTube—to generate “brand buzz.”144 There are numerous
examples of this blending of the commercial within a
traditionally noncommercial medium. Consider, for
example, the flash mob, utilized by everyone from Michael
Jackson fans to T-Mobile, which managed to cull thousands
of willing participants to a sing-along in Trafalagar Square
in London.145 Or, consider another example offered by Ellen
Goodman, whereby two men created a variety of fountains
from placing Mentos breath mints into bottles of Diet
Coke.146 As Rebecca Tushnet observes regarding this event,
the films were “first disavowed, then embraced, by the
manufacturers of the candy and soda.”147 At times, these
events can turn out to be disastrous if the public catches
wind of the identity of the true sponsor. In 2006, Walmart
was caught running a fake blog site about an average
American couple traveling across the country in an RV
spending each night in a Walmart parking lot, where they
recounted stories about the kindness of its employees
(“going the extra mile”) and their extensive array of

143. Delana, supra note 135.
144. See Goodman, supra note 116, at 684-85.
145. Jennifer Gidman, Guerrilla Event Marketing: A Mob in a Flash,
Brandchannel.com,
Aug.
31,
2009,
http://brandchannel.com/features
_effect.asp?pf_id=493.
146. See Goodman, supra note 116, at 684.
147. Rebecca Tushnet, Attenton Must Be Paid: Commercial Speech, UserGenerated Ads, and the Challenge of Regulation, 58 BUFF. L. REV. 721, 738
(2010).
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products.148 It turned out to be a promotional tactic that
was funded by Working Families for Wal-Mart, launched by
Wal-Mart’s public relations firm, which was a paid sponsor
of the trip.149
In many cases, an example of stealth marketing looks,
feels, and sounds like everyday user-generated content,
often wacky and weird, even though it happens to be
sponsored by a company for commercial purposes, and at
times, may challenge the boundaries of speech
classifications in its desire to harness consumer
imagination. And there are different types of such
promotions: Ellen Goodman details a ‘pure peer’ promotion
(a consumer generated ad that is entirely unrelated to the
brand owner); ‘fake peer’ (where a fake blog is actually
sponsored by a brand owner, or a ‘flog’); or ‘mixed peer’
(where a brand owner might solicit, invite, or adopt pure
peer content for its promotional purposes).150 While pure
peer promotion usually falls within noncommercial content,
‘fake peer’ or ‘mixed peer’ raises more complicated issues,
raising the question of whether they should be more heavily
regulated as commercial speech. For example, Trident gum
(which is famous for its tag line about 4 out of 5 dentists
recommend Trident to their patients who chew gum)
created a fake website and asked two North Carolina men
to demonstrate the strength of their teeth—one ripping an
axle off of a car, and the other being hit in the face with a
bowling ball.151 The idea behind the campaigns was to
demonstrate the strength of their teeth due to Trident. Was
this content commercial advertising, user-generated speech,
or something else?
An additional example of stealth advertising involves
the world of ‘buzz marketing,’ or word-of-mouth marketing
techniques, many of which deputize ordinary citizens—your
friends, family (or even your professor, unbeknownst to
148. Posting of Kevin O’Keefe to LEXBLOG: Real Lawyers Have Blogs, Fake
Blog? Walmart Gets Caught With Its Pants Down, http://kevin.lexblog.co
m/2006/10/articles/public-relations/fake-blog-walmart-gets-caught-with-itspants-down/ (Oct. 13, 2006).
149. Id.
150. Goodman, supra note 116, at 701-02.
151. Posting of Frank Reed to WebProNews, Trident Viral Marketing
Campaign Isn’t Working, http://webpronews.com/blogtalk/2009/02/16/tridentviral-marketing-campaign-isnt-working (Feb. 16, 2009).
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you)—to serve as “agents” for specific products.152 Agents are
usually sent coupons, free materials, and directions on how
to market or “talk up” certain products, and are often asked
to send information on their experiences to the company.
Celebrities pitch drugs and products without stating that
they are paid by the company to tout its products. As one
commentator observes,
Corporations have long conducted focus groups (small groups of
people who offer a sampling of the public’s opinions) to find out
what teens think of potential products. Now, knowing that teens
often look to peers to see what’s in, some companies are recruiting
trend-conscious teens to sample new products and then spread the
word about them. For example, a teen may get sneak-preview
movie tickets or a discount at a local store in exchange for talking
up the movie or recruiting friends to patronize the shop. And the
teens getting the freebies may not be required to tell their
audience about that part of the deal-so uninformed teens may
think they’re getting a real recommendation, instead of an
advertising pitch.153

Often, these experiences mirror ordinary behavior
usually displayed by everyday consumers. Rob Walker of
the New York Times recounts an event where Sony Ericsson
hired sixty actors in ten cities to ask strangers if they would
mind taking the actors’ pictures, at which point the actor
would remark about how great their camera was to the
person.154 “And thus,” Walker writes, “an act of civility was
converted into a branding event.”155 One company profiled
by Walker, BzzAgent, which has thousands of agent
volunteers, tells its volunteers that they aren’t obligated to
hide their associations with the company and its campaigns,
but their volunteers certainly don’t always volunteer that
information to others.156 ‘“It just seems more natural, when I
talk about something, if people don’t think I’m trying to
push a product,”’ explained one BzzAgent to Walker.157
152. See Rob Walker, The Hidden (In Plain Sight) Persuaders, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 5, 2004 (Magazine), at 69, 70.
153. Mehta, supra note 117, at 10-13.
154. Walker, supra note 152, at 70.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 130.
157. Id.
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There are myriad issues that stealth marketing and
guerrilla advertising raise, but one of the most
underappreciated stems from a concern about the role of
public space and engagement, and the potential for
commercial speech to encroach on the familiar territory
usually occupied by noncommercial speech.158 Since these
strategies utilize virtually the same channels of
communication and styles of expression as those occupied
by traditional noncommercial forms of expression and
antibrands, the brand slowly encroaches into antibrand
territory. This transition becomes even more pronounced
especially as antibrands become less and less oppositional to
the overall brand, and seem more satirical in nature, and as
brands become more and more willing to engage in selfparody. While Goodman laudably discusses many of the
problems associated with such kinds of stealth marketing,
her most powerful analysis indirectly implicates the ability
of stealth marketing to blur the line between the brand and
the antibrand, making it difficult for the consumer to tell
the difference between the two. Indeed, when the channels
that are relied upon, in both real space and cyberspace, are
the very same ones that also host antibrands, it becomes
difficult to tell whether the content is sponsored, or not.
IV. RECONCILING THE ANTIBRAND AND THE BRAND
As these examples suggest, advertisers are now
developing more and more subtle ways to harness the
interest and subconscious attention of the consumer,
drawing on classic antibranding strategies in the process.
The growth of antibrands has indirectly influenced the
scope and direction of stealth advertising, forcing the
advertiser to come up with new ways to communicate
product information and “image” to the public.
Consequently, just as antibrands now populate public space
(which I define to include areas that have been traditionally
free from branded entertainment and messaging), they also,
indirectly, pose an invitation to the commercial advertiser
to enter these areas as well. As a result, the antibrand and
the brand engage in a delicate dance of recognition and
response to one another, often indirectly.

158. See Goodman, supra note 119.
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The relationship between antibranding and branding, I
shall argue, demonstrates an underlying tension between
corporate and consumer identity that dovetails nicely into a
corresponding conflict between two different kinds of
markets; the market of economic value (goods and
property), and the market of meaning and metaphor. Yet
the most challenging set of questions stems from the role of
trademark law in facilitating the relationship between the
brand and the antibrand. On this point, this concluding
section sketches out a couple of possible shifts that the law
might take. Whereas in prior years, courts have been less
willing to protect antibrands and their expressive
implications, more recently, the law has slowly shifted
towards recognizing the important contributions offered by
consumer commentary and parody, even when those
parodies are not entirely successful, nor entirely
oppositional to the original brand.
In this section, I describe the increasing scope of legal
protection afforded to antibrands generally, a more recent
shift that diverges from the situation I described in Part II.
The last part of this section discusses the implications of the
expanding sphere of protection of the antibrand on the
channels that stealth marketing normally employs,
suggesting that the expansion of protection of the antibrand
makes it all the more necessary for a regulatory regime to
focus on transparency and disclosure in reaching the
consumer.
A. Contemporary Protection of the Antibrand
Initially, as I described in Part II, courts tended to
adversely affect the legal protection of antibranding
practices, lending credence to the fears of First Amendment
advocates. However, in more recent cases, it appears that
courts are beginning to lean in favor of protecting critiques
and parodies, at least in the end on appeal.159 The trend
began, slowly at first, to turn in the other direction, starting
largely from the Ninth Circuit. In 1992, in a seminal case,
Judge Kozinski, on the Ninth circuit, rejected a trademark
action for a case that involved a USA Today poll that asked
159. See William McGeveran, Rethinking Trademark Fair Use, 94 IOWA L.
REV. 49, 51 (2008) (observing that courts are beginning to favor the protection of
critiques and parodies).
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the public, “Which one of the New Kids [on the Block] is the
most popular?”160 In that case, Kozinski outlined the
contours of what later came to be called a “nominative use”
exception, crafting an exception for “comparison, criticism,
or point of reference.”161 The test requires that the product
or service be one that is not readily identifiable without
reference to the trademark; second, that only so much of the
mark is used that is reasonably necessary; and third, that
the user does nothing to suggest “sponsorship or
endorsement by the trademark holder.”162 Kozinski aptly
recognized that the line between trademarks and speech is
often blurred, but most valuably also recognized the need
for an exception that would enable others to have access to
marks for expressive purposes.163
The New Kids case suggested an emerging sphere of
protection for referential uses of a mark, even despite clear
commercial interests, a point that carried strong
implications for protecting the antibrand. However, it was
not until a few years later that the Ninth Circuit dealt with
more direct commentaries, and like the New Kids case,
continued a trend towards expanding protection. In a case
involving a photographer who used Barbie dolls in
compromising positions with food and kitchen appliances,
the Ninth Circuit found that his work constituted a complex
social statement about gender roles and the position of
women in society, and thus deserved protection, based on
his positioning of Barbie in a series of defenseless and
overtly sexualized poses.164 In other words, it recognized the
160. New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 304 (9th
Cir. 1992).
161. Id. at 306.
162. Id. at 308.
163. In the trademark context, the line between speech and trademark
infringement has also caused a number of challenges for First Amendment
advocates and scholars. See Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech:
Constitutional Implications of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of
Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive
Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi Generation, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 397 (1990); Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960
(1993); Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common
Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 1687 (1999); Jessica Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The
Public Interest in the Advertising Age, 108 YALE L.J. 1717 (1999).
164. See Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 802 (9th Cir.
2003).

838

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 58

need to use brands in such commentaries. “Undoubtedly,”
the court wrote, “one could make similar statements
through other means about society, gender roles, sexuality,
and perhaps even social class. But Barbie, and all the
associations she has acquired though Mattel’s impressive
marketing success, conveys these messages in a particular
way that is ripe for social comment.”165 It concluded that the
artist’s use was a fair one under the Copyright Act, and
employed another balancing test under trademark law,
known as the Rogers test, that directed the court to “apply
[the Lanham Act] to artistic works only where the public
interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the
public interest in free expression.”166
The same court also used the Rogers test in another,
earlier case, involving a song based on Barbie, called
“Barbie Girl,” by a popular music group that mocked and
parodied Barbie, reaching largely the same result.167 As
Judge Kozinski noted in that case, “[a]lthough the boundary
between commercial and noncommercial speech has yet to
be clearly delineated, the ‘core notion of commercial speech’
is that it ‘does no more than propose a commercial
transaction” . . . .If speech is not ‘purely commercial’—that
is, if it does more than propose a commercial transaction—
then it is entitled to full First Amendment protection.”168
Since the Barbie Girl song lampooned Barbie’s image,
offering a humorous commentary on the cultural values she
represented, the court found that the song was not
commercial speech.169
More recently, the protection of the antibrand
culminated with a case that directly contradicted the
Starbucks case discussed in Part II, protecting a consumer
commentator who set up a website and sold related
merchandise—coffee mugs and t-shirts—that compared
Wal-Mart to a Nazi regime, using a variety of slogans,
including “Walocaust,” and depicted the company logo.170
165. Id. at 802.
166. Id. at 807 (citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989)).
167. See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 898-99 (9th Cir.
2002).
168. Id. at 906 (citations omitted).
169. Id. at 908.
170. Smith v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 537 F. Supp. 2d. 1302 (N.D. Ga. 2008).
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After receiving a cease-and-desist letter, the defendant
adjusted his website to use a disclaimer, filed a declaratory
action for protection, and registered the domain name ‘WalQuaeda’ in order to compare Wal-Mart’s intellectual
property protection to a terrorist group.171 The defendant
won, on a summary judgment action, finding that the
merchandise conveyed a “scathing parody,” and that it did
not constitute classic commercial speech.172 In its opinion,
the court quoted a Fifth Amendment case that noted,
“speech that is principally based on religious or political
convictions, but which may also benefit the speaker
economically, would fall short of the requirement that the
speech was economically motivated” and therefore would be
considered noncommercial.173 It also cited a Seventh Circuit
case that concluded that t-shirts were “a medium of
expression prima facie protected by the free-speech clause of
the First Amendment, and they do not lose their protection
by being sold rather than given away.”174 Since commercial
success was a secondary motive to his expression of distaste
for Wal-Mart, the court considered the defendant’s
antibrand, even though it was sold on mugs and T-shirts, to
be parodic and noncommercial speech, and outside of the
bounds of trademark dilution.
Even in cases that might indirectly poke fun at a brand,
courts are beginning to permit a wider sphere of commercial
uses of an antibrand. The operable question often turns on
whether or not the parody is successful, that is, whether it
communicates that it is like the original, but not the
original. For example, in a Fourth Circuit case involving a
series of dog chew toys marketed under the term “Chewy
Vuiton,” in reference to “Louis Vuitton,” the court put a
great deal of weight on finding that:
[D]og toys are not the equivalent to “expensive, luxury” Louis
Vuitton handbags . . . . CV is not LV; the designs on the dog toy
are simplified and crude, not detailed and distinguished. The toys
are inexpensive; the handbags are expensive and marketed to be
expensive. And, of course, as a dog toy, one must buy it with pet
171. See id. at 1311.
172. Id. at 1316-17.
173. See id. at 1339 (quoting Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Amway Corp., 242 F.3d
539, 552-53).
174. Id. (citing Ayres v. City of Chi., 125 F.3d 1010, 1015 (7th Cir. 1997).
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supplies and cannot buy it at an exclusive LVM store or boutique
within a department store.175

It continued that that the “irreverent representation”
conveyed a “joking and amusing parody,” pointing out that
“[t]he LVM handbag is provided for the most elegant and
well-to-do celebrity, to proudly display to the public and the
press, whereas the imitation ‘Chewy Vuiton’ ‘handbag’ is
designed to mock the celebrity and be used by a dog.”176
Interestingly, the court used the terms “parody” and “satire”
interchangeably, noting that the dog toy was a comment on
both “the rich and famous,” conspicuous consumption, as
well as the Louis Vuitton name.177
This Fourth Circuit case was also especially instructive
on the question of the relationship between parody and
dilution in light of the recently passed Trademark Dilution
and Revision Act by Congress.178 The Court noted that
parody was not automatically a complete defense to a claim
of dilution by blurring where the defendant uses the parody
175. Louis Vuitton Malletier S.A. v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252,
260 (4th Cir. 2007).
176. Id. at 261.
177. Id. The Court also noted that the parody was enhanced by the fact that
“Chewy Vuiton” dog toys are sold with similar parodies of other famous and
expensive brands-“Chewnel No. 5” targeting “Chanel No. 5”; “Dog Perignonn”
targeting “Dom Perignon”; and “Sniffany & Co.” targeting “Tiffany & Co.” Id.
178. To determine whether a junior mark is likely to dilute a famous mark
through blurring, the TDRA directs the court to consider all factors relevant to
the issue, including six factors that are enumerated in the statute:
(i) The degree of similarity between the mark or trade name and
the famous mark.
(ii) The degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the
famous mark.
(iii) The extent to which the owner of the famous mark is engaging
in substantially exclusive use of the mark.
(iv) The degree of recognition of the famous mark.
(v) Whether the user of the mark or trade name intended to create
an association with the famous mark.
(vi) Any actual association between the mark or trade name and
the famous mark.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(B) (2010); Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 266.
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as its own designation of source, i.e., as a trademark. Under
the statute’s plain language, parodying a famous mark is
protected by the fair use defense only if the parody is not “a
designation of source for the person's own goods or
services.”179 Yet even though the parody, in this case, was
used as a trademark, the court found that the parody did
not dilute the LV mark’s distinctiveness, largely because it
was such an imperfect replication of the famous LV mark,
concluding “by making the famous mark an object of the
parody, a successful parody might actually enhance the
famous mark's distinctiveness by making it an icon. The
brunt of the joke becomes yet more famous.”180 A similar
result also befell another pet-related cologne product named
Tommy Holedigger, named to reference and parody the
Tommy Hilfiger cologne, with a slogan that read, “If You
Like Tommy Hilfiger Your Pet Will Love Timmy
Holedigger.”181 The court recognized its comical nature,
observing, “[o]ne can readily see why high-end fashion
brands would be ripe targets for such mockery, and why pet
perfume is a clever vehicle for it. Even if not technically a
parody, [defendant’s] use is at least a pun or comical
expression—ideas also held to be entitled to First
Amendment protection.”182
Elsewhere, courts have begun to protect antibranding
activities on the web, particularly in cases of consumer
commentary. In one case involving a website called
“ballysucks.com,” which involved a series of complaints
179. As the statute provides:
The following shall not be actionable as dilution by blurring or
dilution by tarnishment under this subsection:
(A) Any fair use . . . other than as a designation of source for the
person's own goods or services, including use in connection
with
.
.
.
parodying
.
.
.
.
15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(A)(ii) (2010) (emphasis added); Vuitton, 507 F.3d
at 267.
180. Vuitton, 507 F.3d at 267.
181. Tommy Hilfiger Licensing, Inc. v. Nature Labs, LLC, 221 F. Supp. 2d 410
(S.D.N.Y. 2002).
182. Significantly, while the court recognized that the bar towards protection
is slightly higher when a mark is used as a source designation (i.e. a trademark
use), such as this one and the Chewy Vuitton mark, the plaintiff did not show
enough of a risk of consumer confusion. Id. at 416.
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against the health club, a court drew a line between Bally’s
sponsored site, which was a “commercial advertisement,”
and the gripe site, referred to as “consumer commentary.”183
The court concluded that “no reasonably prudent Internet
user would believe that “Ballysucks.com’ is the official Bally
site or is sponsored by Bally.”184 Other cases began to
support consumer commentary, even when the websites
utilized a company name alone or in connection with other
disparaging terms.185 Notably, the Fourth Circuit also
backtracked from its earlier view in the PETA case, when it
protected a site that deliberately misspelled the Reverend
Jerry Falwell’s name in a site, fallwell.com, that took issue
with the Reverend’s views on homosexuality.186 It
distinguished its earlier findings in PETA on the grounds
that the earlier case involved questions of parody, whereas
the Falwell case involved a somewhat different question of
consumer confusion.
At first glance, one might conclude that the tide is
changing in enabling the antibrand to flourish in both real
and cyberspace. It seems patently unthinkable, to many
nonlawyers, that the parodies we have discussed in this
paper would lead to legal scrutiny. However, while the cases
we’ve discussed from the Ninth, Fourth, and other circuits
lead to some amelioration of the concerns about chilling
speech and commentary, it also bears mention that not all
of the cases, in recent years, have followed this direction.
The issue of commercial sales of an antibrand still
remains a thorny one for courts. In prior work, I suggested
that trademark doctrine tended to conflate commercial and
non-commercial speech.187 The result, as I suggested in Part
II, is that courts often construed commercial speech
183. Bally Total Fitness Holding Corp. v. Faber, 29 F. Supp. 2d 1161 (C.D. Cal.
1998).
184. Id. at 1165.
185. See, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002 (9th
Cir. 2004); TMI, Inc. v. Maxwell, 368 F.3d 433 (5th Cir. 2004); Taubman Co. v.
Webfeats, 319 F.3d 770, 777-78 (6th Cir. 2003); Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters.,
177 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D. Mich. 2001); Lucent Techs., Inc. v. Lucentsucks.com,
95 F. Supp. 2d 528 (E.D. Va. 2000). For more discussion of these cases, see
Travis, supra note 57.
186. See Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309 (4th Cir. 2005).
187. See Katyal, supra note 22.
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overinclusively, thereby enjoining parodic representations,
both in real space and online. While the law has shifted
somewhat, when the commercial element is a more
dominant aspect of the parody, the outcome can be less
predictable. For example, in yet another parody case
involving dog toys, Anheuser-Busch successfully enjoined a
dog toy that resembled a Budweiser beer bottle that was
called “Buttwiper,” on the grounds that the survey evidence
reflected some confusion, and that since Budweiser did
produce comparably-priced dog toys, they competed in the
same market.188
As William McGevernan has observed, the doctrines
that courts employ to protect defendants are “overlapping,
confusing, volatile, and [even] cumbersome,” leading to
significant uncertainty.189 For McGevernan, the uncertainty
of these standards has created a classic chilling effect on
unlicensed uses of trademarks, even when those uses may
be ultimately considered perfectly lawful under existing
doctrines.190 Less protection, for example, might be
extended in cases where the antibranding is less directly
oppositional than the ones we have discussed. Consider that
in most of the antibrand examples I have outlined—Barbie
in a food blender,191 a song celebrating Barbie’s “plastic” and
superficial cultural attributes,192 a low-priced chew toy or
perfume,193 or a gripe site194—the critique of a brand (or a
certain lifestyle celebrated by a particular brand) is
relatively straightforward to the audience. In other words, it
is pretty clear when a brand is being made fun of. As many
courts have observed, it seems ludicrous to think that a
plaintiff would sponsor its very own “gripe site,” or a lowpriced, inferior chew toy that pokes fun at its own brand
name.
But in cases where the commentary is more oblique, or
less directly oppositional to a particular brand, or perhaps
188. Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. VIP Prods., 666 F. Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Mo. 2008).
189. McGeveran, supra note 159, at 51.
190. Id. at 52.
191. See supra notes 164-66 and accompanying text.
192. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 175-80 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
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more promotional or commercial in nature, an antibrand
may risk losing legal protection due to any one of these
variables. This is particularly so when survey evidence
demonstrates some form of confusion among the consuming
public. The Southern District of New York, for example,
enjoined a popcorn maker manufacturer that marketed a
product called “Dom Popingon,” on the grounds that survey
evidence also suggested a relationship between the popcorn
maker and the champagne producer.195
Finally, and perhaps most important, while common
and statutory law seems to have evolved to protect the
antibrand, significant questions remain regarding the
powerful reach of informal trademark enforcement at the
hands of everyday lawyers. As McGevernan writes:
Markholders policing their portfolios send cease-and-desist letters
attacking virtually any unlicensed use of their trademarks. From
television networks to insurance companies, risk-averse
institutional gatekeepers demand expansive rights clearance.
Lawyers counsel clients to avoid the trouble of a potential lawsuit.
In response to this array of powerful entities, speakers either
avoid unlicensed uses of trademarks entirely or withdraw them at
the first hint of legal action.196

Taken together, these considerations suggest that while the
antibrand has garnered some protection, its protection still
pales in comparison to that of the conventional brand—and
perhaps understandably so in some cases, particularly those
that suggest a strong commercial intent to profit, or which
cause consumer confusion or actionable dilution.
B. An Economy of Opposites?
Although some of the above outcomes are extremely
positive developments for free speech advocates, as I have
also suggested, they are also plagued with uncertainty and
unpredictability, leading many risk averse defendants to
avoid unlicensed uses, as McGevernan suggests. In addition
to the chilling effect that some courts facilitate, the existing
195. Schieffelin & Co. v. Jack Co. of Boca, Inc., 850 F. Supp. 232 (S.D.N.Y.
1994) (finding that Dom Popingnon popcorn was not a sufficiently strong parody
of DOM PERIGNON champagne to avoid confusion, based on the evidence of
actual confusion).
196. McGeveran, supra note 159, at 52.
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sphere of uncertainty may lead a trademark owner to act
even more vociferously to protect against unauthorized
uses. In other words, the expanding sphere of the antibrand
can lead to more brand surveillance, where trademark
owners police the boundaries of noncommercial content to
control unauthorized references and uses.
The absence of regulation has significant implications
for the dialogue between the brand and the antibrand. If a
brand takes on characteristics that resembles an antibrand,
it still qualifies as commercial speech. However, when a
brand deputizes an ordinary citizen to create a promotional
campaign, the answer is less clear—is it commercial,
noncommercial, or something else? And when an antibrand
takes on elements of a brand (that is, it operates as a
trademark), it may not necessarily be designated as
commercial speech. In the Starbucks and Dom Perignon
cases, the commercial intent of the antibrand clearly played
a factor in the decision to enjoin the expression. Yet it
becomes difficult to discern the line between branding,
stealth marketing, and antibranding, when the very same
channels are used for each. The same ad, which could be an
ad for Levis jeans—could also be an antibrand, a
commercial, or a satirical commentary on the jeans’
themselves.197
As I have suggested, many types of stealth marketing
often take place within the traditional channels that
antibranding occupies, like YouTube or Facebook, leading to
a blurring of the lines between commercial and
noncommercial forms of expression. So, as a result, it
becomes impossible, then, to distinguish between the brand
and the antibrand, and the division between them becomes
further destabilized, making it difficult for the consumer to
locate the sponsorship behind the message, and making it
all the more necessary for brand managers to act more
readily to protect the goodwill behind their marks in public
space.
Consider Facebook as an example of this growing trend
towards potential overenforcement. If you’ve spent any time
on Facebook, you are keenly aware of the vast numbers of
pages that are devoted to companies, products, and
celebrities, often making it impossible to tell the difference
197. See Guys Backflip into Jeans,
=pShf2VuAu_Q (last visited May 4, 2010).

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v
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between official and unofficial pages.198 Sometimes, fan
sponsored pages lead to collaborations with the company, as
they did in a case where Coca-Cola collaborated with two
fans who created a Facebook page. In other cases, however,
companies are less enthused, and may seek to use copyright
or trademark protection to prevent individuals from putting
up fan pages.
Recently, Facebook decided to require individuals who
have company pages demonstrate proof that they
legitimately speak for the company. “By helping companies
keep control of their messages, analysts say Facebook is
looking forward to the day when it can charge companies for
all kinds of applications.”199 Yet by relying on an
authentication process, Facebook essentially allows
companies to take control of the brand itself, and
potentially, to control or to limit “unofficial” commentary—
positive or negative—about a particular brand.
These complications extend further outward towards
sponsored types of user-generated content, particularly the
“mixed” peer production that Goodman describes.200 As
Rebecca Tushnet has pointed out in her article in this
Symposium, “[w]here ads don’t necessarily look like ads, a
separate kind of consumer deception can be at issue:
deception about source, where consumers might give a
message a different amount of credibility if they knew its
actual sponsorship.”201 User-generated ads create particular
problems on a doctrinal level because individual speakers
can generally make false claims about products (as long as
they are not defamatory or otherwise create a clear and
present danger of harm), whereas traditional advertisers
are governed more stringently; they are held strictly liable
for falsehoods and are required to substantiate any material
claims.202 From an advertiser’s perspective, then, it makes
sense to deputize individuals, rather than corporations,
given this less stringent standard—as Tushnet notes,
198. See Alisha Roth & Kai Ryssdal, Facebook to Discern Companies, Fans,
MARKETPLACE, Oct. 13, 2009, http://marketplace.publicradio.org/display/we
b/2009/10/13/pm-facebook/.
199. Id.
200. Goodman, supra note 116.
201. Tushnet, supra note 148, at 721.
202. Id. at 738-39.
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“volunteers may now be able to disseminate misleading
claims about products to millions, subject to minimal or no
regulation.”203 Further, as Tushnet argues, evidence from
cognitive psychology and related fields suggests that a
message’s source plays an important role in enabling
consumers to evaluate the quality of the message.204 The
less the content resembles classic advertising, in short, the
more credibility the message attains.
The current state of affairs thus calls for some need for
administrative clarification. More recently, a disclosure
regime has attracted a particular degree of interest from the
Federal Trade Commission, which, as Tushnet summarizes,
require: “(1) substantiation for ad claims made by
endorsers, even in new media, and (2) disclosure of an
endorsement relationship that wouldn’t be obvious from
context (as it is obvious when a spokesperson appears in a
traditional 30-second TV ad).”205 The FTC also expressed
concerns about hiring viral marketing teams to post
comments in non-traditional spaces, such as a travel review
site; or a fake blog or ‘flog’.206
The FTC regulations—recently updated in late June of
2010—herald a new generation of sponsored web content.
The FTC page explaining the guidelines points out that
“[i]t’s always been the law that if an ad features an endorser
who’s a relative or employee of the marketer—or if an
endorser has been paid or given something of value to tout
the marketer’s product—the ad is misleading.”207 The
updated explanations help to clarify how these principles
apply to web based content, pointing out that a speaker
203. Id. at 739.
204. See id. at 748 (quoting Helen Norton, The Measure of Government Speech:
Identifying Expression’s Source, 88 B.U. L. REV. 587, 592-93 (2008).
205. Id. at 745 nn.78-80 and accompanying text.
206. Id. at 746. The disjunction between user and producer-generated content
has also led to a curious wrinkle with Section 230 of the Communications
Decency Act, which immunizes internet service providers from the defamatory
speech of their users. See Tushet’s excellent discussion of this point. Id. at 738.
Since Tushnet’s discussion of these disclosure regimes is so comprehensive, I
wish to draw attention to only a few aspects of her discussion.
207. Press Release, FTC, FTC Facts for Business, The FTC’s Revised
Endorsement Guides: What People Are Asking 2 (June 2010),
http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/edu/pubs/business/adv/bus71.pdf [hereinafter FTC Facts
for Business].
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must disclose a sponsorship relationship if they received
anything of value from a marketer. As the guidelines
suggest, the simple delineation between “sponsored” or “ad”
content can go a long way towards clarifying the source for
the consumer. On Facebook, for example, individuals who
are compensated by a particular corporation allegedly
cannot be “fans” of that institution, helping to delineate
“authentic” fanlike emotions from paid endorsements.208
And on Twitter, the FTC regulations require individuals to
quickly
demarcate
when
their
posts
are
paid
advertisements.209
While disclosure might go a long way towards clarifying
commercial messages in everyday web content, it is
important to note that a disclosure regime, like any other
administrative regime, adds both administrative and
agency costs, and may potentially introduce some new forms
of confusion for speakers. Some closing reservations
therefore may be appropriate. First, it is important to note
that despite the benefits of a disclosure regime, much of
contemporary product placement—especially on television
and film—is brokered through an interesting loophole
whereby merchandise is donated to the content producers,
thereby eliding the requirement that paid product
placement be disclosed.210 Thus, the new FTC disclosure
requirements may be useful, but only insofar that they
address all forms of donated and paid placements on the
web. Nevertheless, as Tushnet also points out,
nondisclosure can contribute to a further erosion of trust
from consumers, where they may be saturated with so many
advertising messages that an entire medium may lose
credibility.211 This risk is particularly pronounced when we
consider the reach of “brand creep” into the areas normally
208. Posting of Matthew Crane to Twin Cities TECH CORNER: [TC]2,
http://www.mndaily.com/blogs/tech-corner/2009/10/05/ftc-advertising-regulation
s-now-extend-facebook-twitter (Oct. 5, 2009, 21:31 CST); see also FTC Facts for
Business, supra note 207, at 4.
209. FTC Facts for Business, supra note 208, at 5.
210. See Ross D. Petty & Joan Lindsey-Mullikin, The Regulation of Practices
that Promote Brand Interest: A 3C’s Guide for Consumer Brand Managers, 15 J.
PROD. & BRAND MGMT. 22 (Issue 1) (2006) (citing MICHAEL F. JACOBSON & LAURIE
ANN MAZUR, MARKETING MADNESS: A SURVIVOR GUIDE FOR A CONSUMER SOCIETY
72 (1995)).
211. Tushnet, supra note 148, at 764-65.
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populated by antibrands. Second, others criticize disclosure
regimes—Eric Goldman, most notably, has argued that
disclosures can be hidden or, in an age of information
overload, can simply add to the distrust that consumers
already face.212
Nevertheless, despite these reservations, a disclosure
regime may assist reconciling the rivalrous relationship
between the brand and the antibrand: they may be separate
and somewhat unequal, but at least a disclosure regime
enables both to peacefully coexist in public space, allowing
the consumer to discern the difference between them.
CONCLUSION
As antibrands demonstrate, clear delineations between
commercial and non-commercial speech are often impossible
to apprehend, particularly when dealing with converging
areas of parody, trademarks, and the marketplace of goods.
As this article has suggested, the conflict between
trademark and speech protections masks an underlying
conflict between different types of markets—one a
marketplace of goods, and the other a marketplace of ideas.
One answer, then, is to focus on delineating and clarifying
the relationship between the corporation and the consumer,
between advertising and anti-advertising; for, in
recognizing the interaction between the brand and the
antibrand, we can value these commentaries for what they
suggest about the new generation of consumption and
consumer expression.

212. See Eric Goldman, Stealth Risks of Regulating Stealth Marketing, 85 TEX.
L. REV. SEE ALSO 11, 11, 14 (2006), available at http://www.texaslrev
.com/seealso/vol/85/responses/goldman.

